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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM AND ITS BACKGROUND
Among theological circles today, neo -orthodoxy, or
the dialectical theology, as it Is now usually referred to
in library indexing, has a strong influence. However, neo-
orthodoxy has a background which goes much deeper than the
present century. Though many dialectical theologians of the
present century would refer back to the reformers and to the
early Roman Catholic Church, their primary contender was a
Danish theologian of the last century, SeVen Kierkegaard, who
is commonly known as the father of modern existentialism.
The problem of this thesis is to show the effect of
the theological thinking of S^ren Kierkegaard upon contempo
rary theology by indicating his influence in the theology of
one leading contemporary neo-orthodox theologian, namely
Karl Earth.
Considerations of space lead the writer to choose
Barth as one of the leading if not the very leading neo-
orthodox theologian of this century. Barth's relation to
Kierkegaard is also closer than any other theologian. The
following statement by Hoyle gives emphasis to this:
. . . The influence of Kierkegaard upon Barth and all
the group around him is predominant. Barth himself de
clared In the preface to the fourth edition of his
Romans; HI keep in mind always, as much as possible,
what Kierkegaard described as the infinitely qualitative
difference between time and eternity, both in Its nega-
2tlve and positive meaning." ... In fact the emphasis
on the Either�Or, on faith as the only attitude of man
towards God, and the criticism of conventional Christi
anity which mark the Barthian School are simply an under
scoring of this great Dane's ideas* Kierkegaard came
again into vogue at the beginning of the century when
his works were being translated into German and Barth
caught the infection. . . � Thus to the mental make-up
of Barth we find these factors�the inherited tradition
of the Reformed Church, the influence of Herrmann and
his re-action under the stress of pastoral work, the.
ferment of Kierkegaard's Ideas at the susceptible period
of youth�all combining with the social unrest of the
period which culminated in the Great War to give him his
need of a gospel for a time of 'crisis. �1
If Kierkegaard's influence were limited to that which
he exerted on Barth, that would be enough to merit this study.
Kierkegaard has also had a crucial impact upon many other men
such as Emil Brunner, Paul Tlllich, and Reinhold Niebuhr .
Though he was little read and known in his day, he has in
our century been rediscovered and has become the greatest
single influence In modern day theology. Bernard Ramm states:
"There is no doubt that Kierkegaard Is the first of the neo-
orthodox theologians and that while not all of neo-orthodoxy
derives from him, a great portion does."^
Because of the very nature of this thesis, the study
of S/ren Kierkegaard becomes a background to understand the
theology of Karl Barth. However, It is helpful, especially
1R. Birch Hoyle, The Teaching of Karl garth (London;
Student Christian Movement Press, 1950*7, PP� 34, 35.
2Bernard Ramm, "The Incipient Heresies of SeVen
Kierkegaard," United Evangelical Action, October 1, 1952,
P. 10.
3for those who are new to this field, to give here a very
brief biographical sketch of Kierkegaard, as a means of pre
paring the way for a better understanding of his theology.
MHe was born at Copenhagen in 1813, the youngest son
of a retired woolen-draper In easy circumstances; he died in
1855. Prom his father, Michael Kierkegaard, he learnt on�
lesson which stayed with him to the end�that faith is re
sponsibility to God expressed in personal decision. h3 Add
to this Kierkegaard ' s father confiding to his son of his
own guilty secrets of the past, plus Kierkegaard's sorrow
ful breaking of his engagement to his deeply loved sweet
heart, Regin� Olson, plus a disgraceful episode with a sat
irical weekly journal of Copenhagen, and one has the back
ground which so largely contributed to Kierkegaard's dismal
theology .
Perhaps in part due to this eccentric background,
Kierkegaard was little read by his contemporaries. Less than
sixty copies of his Concluding Unscientific Postscript were
sold while he lived and, less than four thousand English
translations were sold up to January 1951.
4
Kierkegaard was subject to both positive and nega
tive influences. Of course, the influenoe of the extremely
3 Ibid., p. 7.
�%ugh Ross Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology
(London: Nisbet and Co. Ltd., 1949 ) , pp. 220-21.
4guilty conscience of his father can never he discounted.
The circumstances of his father's life meant much in molding
the thought life of this man. Through an episode with a
satirical weekly Journal of Copenhagen in which Kierkegaard
was held up to Intensive ridioule, and lacking friends to
encourage him at the time he needed it, he claimed that God
directly opened his eyes to the deeper truth that being a
Christian means to suffer. Thus to him, seeking for company
In faith's pilgrimage was a mortal sin*5
Hegel was probably Kierkegaard's most potent negative
influence. "Hegel stood for the royal autocracy of human
thought, the exclusive supremacy of the so-called creative
reason of man . . . His chief purpose was not to cleanse
or cure men's lives, but to explain them. Thus Hegel dealt
lightly with sin. Kierkegaard opposed Hegel vigorously.
His own 'qualitative' dlaleotio was set in opposition to
Hegel's dialectic. He revolted against the Hegelian idea
that human spirit and the Divine are identical* Kierkegaard
felt � � that the Hegelian philosophy by failing to define
its relation to the existing individual, and by Ignoring the
ethical, confounds existence."''' So It is seen that Kierke
gaard's thought was in a sense a reaction against the
5 Ibid., p, 251. 6Ibid. , pp. 225-26.
7Se'ren Kiergaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
trans, David P. Swenson ( Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1944), p, 275.
5extreme of Hegelianism. In fact he himself elaims that hia
theology was "a corrective to things as they are. 1,8 This is
very similar to the revolt that neo-orthodoxy has taken
against the old-line liberalism, remembering that many of the
leading neo-orthodox men of today were originally from the
old line of modernism which is deeply indebted to Hegelian
humanism*
More positively Kierkegaard was Influenced by Hume.
Evidence seems to point to the fact that he received Ms
notion of faith as being contrary to reason from Hume.9
Thus it would seem that Hume stands in the background of
the metaphysical scepticism of Kierkegaard.
In this definitive study of Kierkegaard's theology,
it quickly becomes apparent that It Is a "dark theology.1.
Expressive of this Is hia statement t "Alas, the doors of
fortune do not open inward, so that by storming them one can
force them open} but they open outward, and therefore noth
ing can be done."10 This gloomy outlook can only be under
stood by looking deep into the domestic and sooial life of
this man. There will be found the roots of disappointment
8Maokintosh, op_. pit. , p. 255,
9Ramra, op_. cit*. p. 10.
lOs^ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, trans. David F.
Swenaon and Lillian Marvin Swenson TPrinoeton: Princeton
University Press, 1944), p. 18,
6and disillusionment that twisted this brilliant mind to
assume auoh an existential theological slant.
A brief statement needs to be mad� concerning the
organization of the remainder of this thesis. The five sub*
sequent ohapters are written in a dual fashion. The first
major section of each of these chapters deals with some
area of Kierkegaard's theology. The second major section of
each of these chapters compares Barth's theology to the
particular area under discussion. In each of these five
chapters, the area under discussion breaks down into two
minor divisions. These same minor divisions are used In the
discussion of Barth's theology*
Tne final chapter of this thesis la concerned with a
summarization of the preceding five ohapters and an analysis
of the conclusions that this study has revealed.
Because this is a comparative study between the
theologies of two men, much of the text of this thesis is
taken up in using the quotations from the writings of these
two men to indicate their similarities.
CHAPTER II
EXISTENCE AND SUBJECTIVITY
It would seem that existence and subjectivity make an
ideal starting point for this study because they are both so
fundamental in all of Kierkegaard's thinking as well as
Barth's.
I. EXISTENCE AND SUBJECTIVITY AS POUND
WITHIN KDERKEGAARC'S WRITING
Existence . Although modem existential philosophy is
largely derived from the thought of Kierkegaard, it has been
noted that he himself never precisely defined the term.-*- He
has, however, stated what existence Implied for him: "Exist
ence is the ohild of the infinite and the finite, the eternal
and the temporal, and is therefore constantly striving . . .
an existing individual ia constantly in process of becoming."'
Upon this one word "existential," Kierkegaard has hung much
of his theology. Helmut Kuhn says, "By the epithet 'exis
tential' we mean to describe a thinking animated and support -
nDonald Attwater, Modern Christian Revolutionaries
(New York: The Devln�Adair Company, 1947), p. 21.
2SeVen Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
trans. David P, Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Prince-
ton Unlveraity Press, 1944), p. 79.
ed by the personal life of the thinker.
1,3 Existential
thinking concerns the here and now�the making of decisions
as one who is a part of the situation and not merely a spec*
tator. In fact, as Walter Lowrie states in his introduction.
Kierkegaard held that the essential task of human existence
was,
n
... in realising a decisiveness of spirit which
forms and establishes the personality."4 This seems to be
the whole pivotal point for Kierkegaard's theology, for this
existential view becomes the springboard for his further
development of thought.
Kierkegaard's theology has often been termed "meta
physical skepticism" due to the fact that he refuses to con
cede that anything else can be proven as reality besides
one's individual existenoe. On this point he uses many of
the same arguments that the skeptic uses to deny the exist
ence of the material world and the authenticity of history.
Thus one's own existence is the only thing man could even
come close to proving as real. All other phenomena may be
possibilities but not proved realities. It is postulated
that the apparent trustworthiness of the senses is an
illusion. Kierkegaard argues:
3Helmut Kuhn, "Existentialism�Christian and Anti-
Christian," Theology Today, October 1949, p. 311.
4Walter Lowrie (trans.), S/ren Kierkegaard, Fear and
Trembling, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941 ),
p. XXIV.
9It ia not possible for an existing Individual, least
of all aa an existing Individual, to hold fast absolutely
a suspension of the dialectic moment, namely, existence.
This would require another medium than existence, which
is the dialectical moment. ... The only reality that
exists for an existing individual is his own ethical
reality. To every other reality he stands in cognitive
relation j but true knowledge consists in translating the
real Into the possible ,5
Thus Kierkegaard ia saying that man cannot contemplate him
self because he cannot find anything but himself as a meas
uring stick, so man actually exists only aa he is aware of
his basic passion for eternal happiness. It is necessary to
notice here the 'dialectical moment* as being the oooasion
when on� reasons himself to the point of despair and abandon*
ment of reason, having found reason to be a mere futile
attempt to seek reality. Thus at this moment faith swings
into operation bringing the individual nearer to Absolute
Reality which is God.
Man's attempt to prove his existence through thought
ends only in contradiction. Every other reality besides his
own reality is known only by thinking. However, it is a
question whether his own thinking can abstract reality of
himself. Thought and meditation are misleading for Klerk*
egaard for he says:
If thought could give reality in the sense of actual
ity, and not merely validity in the sense of possibility,
it would also have the power to take away from the exist
ing individual the only reality to which he sustains a
5Kierkegaard, op_, clt., p. 280.
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real relationship namely hia own.6
Thought and existence are anthropomorphic. God neither thinks
nor exists, but God creates and is eternal. "Man thinks and
exists, and existence separates thought and being, holding
them apart from one another in success Ion.a^ Real action is
then not the external act, but an Internal decision in which
the individual goes beyond the mere possibility of existence
and identifies himself with the content of hia thought in
order to exist in it.
This aot of existence Is not static, but is a process
of becoming. This existing subjeotive thinker is constantly
reproducing this existential thought-situation and trans
lating it into terms of process or becoming. Kierkegaard
carries this so far as to claim, "No one starts by being av
Christian, everyone becomes such in the fulness of time."0
The initial decision in Christianity is minimized to an al- -
most meaningless position because the idea of "becoming"" is
so over-emphasized. He seems to say that many stumble along
the blind alley of "becoming without any assurance of arrival.
Such an extreme position comes as a result of Kierkegaard's
reaction to the evils within the church of his day, which he
so vehemently attacks in Ms Attack Upon Christendom, in
6 Ibid., p. 265.
7 Ibid., p. 296.
8 lb id., p. 523.
11
hia Point of view he goes so far as to state :
... the whole of my work as an author ia related to
Christianity, to the problem "of becoming a Christian,"
with a direct or Indirect polemic against the monstrous
illusion we call Christendom, or against the Illusion
that in such a land as ours all are Christians of a
sort*�
It is this idea of "becoming" as an individual devel
oping experience that caused Kierkegaard to make the claim:
"To cram Christianity into a child is something that cannot
be done, for it is a general rule that everyone comprehends
only what he has use for, and the ohild has no deoislve use
for Christianity."10 Thus Christianity is worthless to the
one who has not been able to think through to the end of
himself and to see his need of "becoming."
One never arrives at his existence so that he could
stop for a moment this constant process of becoming into
existence. Thus Kierkegaard Bays, "Thought and being mean
one and the same thing . . ."1X He holds that �very man is
by nature designed to become a thinker. Thinking like this
will make man aware of his own inner passion to have eternal
happiness. However, it is not God's fault that most men
through habit, and routine, and want of passion, and affec-
9S0ren Kierkegaard, Point of View, trans. Walter
Lowrie (London: Oxford UniversiIy~Press , 1939), p# 6.
10Kierkegaard, Concluding, Unscientific Postscript,
p. 523.
^ Ibid,, p. 170.
12
tion, and goasipping with friends and neighbors, gradually,
ruin themselves so they are thoughtless, and thus go on to
base their eternal happiness on something other than passion.
It ia upon this basis that Kierkegaard asserts, "It is im
possible to exist without passion, unless w� understand the
word 'exist' in the loose sense of a so-called existence. "12
As this study proceeds, there will come an increased aware
ness of his extreme emphasis on this idea of man's passion
for eternal happiness as a foundation for what Kierkegaard
expounds. He refers to this passion as "infinite" which puts
It in a class with God's. It Is that drive within man which
he can either suppress or follow, but can never destroy.
At this point, it becomes helpful to consider Attwa-
ter's discussion of the way in which Kierkegaard relates
reason to this basic passion of man:
It seems clear, indeed, that he ranks "passion" or
feeling higher than abstract reason in the scale of
apprehenaion of existential truth. Upon the premise
that It is "the while man facing the whole mystery of
life" who can alone reach reality, it must be so. For,
while such reason is rare and at one remove from reality,
feeling is universal and immediate.
In so far aa it denies to abstract reason and Intel
lect the monopoly of truth, existential thinking thus
tends towards antl-lntelleotuallsm and even irrational*
ism.
Intellect, abstract reason and analytical science are
for him not primary, but they are secondary; they are
servants of the human spirit who have usurped the sover-
13
eign seat of the existential decision of the "whole man"
and, as such, are to be fought. But he nowhere suggests
that reason Is not an important element in the apprehen
sion of the whole man to which he appeals, and he him
self attacks what he believes to be a false us� of reason
with the weapons of reason. Indeed he specifically
declares that "the race must go through reason to the
absolute" (J.1256).13
Thus It becomes necessary to understand Kierkegaard � a theory
that all men have a basic passion for eternal happiness
which, if allowed to take its free course, will drive man to
the end of his reason�to the dialectical moment of despair�
where exercised faith brings him into true or 'authentic'
existence. Here he is ever becoming more Christian each
time he arrives at this dialectical moment of exlatentlal
thinking .
Subjectivity. Coming very close to the idea of the
existential is the idea of the aubjeotive. In fact, if one
were to reread this discussion on existence with this in
mind, one could not help but be impressed that Kierkegaard's
whole beginning ia from within the individual. Of course,
this leaves an opening for relativity, and for variation
from one individual to another. However, Kierkegaard tenda
to offset this, laying down a certain pattern for the
"pasaion" as being universal to all men. For him the whole
of religious existence is aub jective. Even the fall of Adam
13Attwater, oj>. cit,, p. 28.
14
and Eve in the book of Genesis, which is thought by orthodoxy
to be historical, Is considered by Kierkegaard only to be
mythological and to represent outwardly what actually oc
curred and occurs to man Inwardly.
Kierkegaard lays strong emphasis upon the obvious
fact that every individual has a bit of the subjective. Ex
istence Is only found through a subjective listening to man's
infinite passion. Hence, history and science are objeotlve
and cannot be trusted. Kierkegaard says it this way:
How if- Christianity is essentially something object
ive, It is necessary for the observer to be objective.
But if Christianity is essentially subjectivity, it is
a mistake for the observer to be objective. ... But
the utmost tension of human subjectivity finds its
expression in the infinite passionate Interest In an
eternal happiness�**
Thus Kierkegaard exhorts men to be objectively light but to
be subjectively as heavy as possible, Kierkegaard continues
to undercut objectivity in the following statement about
science:
Sad to say, however. In the strict scientific
disciplines where objectivity is a requisite, there it
is seldom met with} for a scholar �quipped with a
thorough first-hand acquaintance wife his field, is a
great rarity. In relation to Christianity, on the other
hand, objective Christianity and none other, is eo ipso
a pagan, for Christianity is precisely an affair of
spirit, and so of subjectivity, and so of inwardness.*0
^Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
p. 51 *
*5Ibid., p. 42,
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Thus he defines Christianity:
Christianity is spirit, spirit is inwardness, Inward
ness is subjectivity, subjectivity is essentially passion,
and In its maximum an Infinite, personal, passionate
interest in one's eternal happiness.16
Prom this it ia not hard to see why Kierkegaard holds
that there are only two realities that are visible: the God-
man and man's own soul. Also In his view of subjectivity he
Claims that a Christian may so shut up his religion within
himself as to be undiatingulshable among worldlings .1? Thus
the knight of faith la all bound up in the business of find
ing himself. As Reldar Thomte explains:
The Kierkegaard1an expression, "choosing oneself" is
the counterpart to the Greek yvwBt oeautov "know thyself"
(the Inscription of the temple of Delphi). It signifies
that the ethical individual is to know himself not in
the sense of mere contemplation, but In the sense of
coming to oneself, as an inward action of the personality.
"Choosing oneself" is Illustrated in terms of impregna
tion and birth. Through the Individual's Intercourse
with himself he is in a sense impregnated and gives birth
to himself. The self which the individual knows is the
real self, but it ia also the Ideal self or the pattern
according to which he is to mold himself. As a pattern
It lies in a sense outside of the individual, yet it is
part of him as something which la his possession, hia
self.18
Certainly it is not out of place to notice her� the absence
of altruism in Kierkegaard as well as his failure to take a
realistic approach to life. Though he would never agree to
l6Jbld., p. 33, 17 Ibid., p. 252.
IQReidar Thomte, Kierkegaard 's Philosophy of Religion
(Princeton: Princeton University Press,' 1948), p. 49,
16
being impraotioal, yet here this extreme subjectivism tends
to lead one in that direction. Practicality for him oper
ates more in the area of Inner adjustment to one's real self
than in the outreach of benefit to others. The constant in
filtration of the existential and the subjective elements
are very present in the subsequent ohapters which discuss
other areas of Kierkegaard's theology.
II . EXISTENCE AND SUBJECTIVITY AS POUND
WITHIN BARTH'S WRITING
Though the theologies of Kierkegaard and Barth are
not Identical at these points of existence and subjectivity,
yet they are so similar that a study of Barth at these points
can not help but remind one of the forerunner, Kierkegaard.
Existence. Because Barth is more of a theologian and
Kierkegaard is more of a philosopher, the definite discuss
ions of existence as such are not as pronounced in Barth.
Yet there is no mistake about the Influence of existential
thinking in Barth's theology. Where Kierkegaard is more
likely to use the word 'thinking' when talking about exist
ence, Barth uses the word 'believe.* The following quota
tions Illustrate the place of faith In Berth's idea of
existence :
, � � "I believe" means, MI exist In believing." I
have every occasion to know that my existing as such,
is not my believing? that I can only believe that my
17
oxlst ing-in-faith is God's work and not mine. But so
far as I believe I exlat in faith.19
For Barth, man's proof of his own existeno� comes primarily
through faith. This is in agreement with Kierkegaard who
brings out a stronger emphasis on the thought processes
whereby man is brought into the faith experience. Barth ex
plains the reality of life and existence in his Dogmatics
in Outline .
... Christian faith is the illumination of the
reason in which men become free to live In the truth of
Jesus Christ and thereby to become sure also of the
meaning of their own existence and of the ground and
goal of all that happens.
. � * If a man believes and knows God, he can no
longer ask, What is the meaning of my life? But by be
lieving he actually lives the meaning of Ms life, the
meaning of Ms oreaturellness , of Ms individuality, in
the limits of oreaturellness and individuality and in
the fallibility of Ms existence, in the sin in which he
is involved and of wMoh dally and hourly he is guilty;
yet he also lives it with the aid which is daily and
hourly imparted to him through God's interceding for him,
in spite of him and without deserving it. He recognises
the task assigned to him in this whole, and the hope
vouchsafed to Mm in and with this task, because of the
grace by wMoh he may live and the praise of the glory
promised him, by which he is even here and now secretly
surrounded in all lowliness. The believer confesses
this meaning of his existence. The Christian Creed
speaks of God as the ground and goal of all that exists.
The ground and goal of the entire cosmos means Jesus
Christ, And the unheard-of thing may and must be said,
that where Christian faith exists, there also exists,
through God's being trusted, inmost familiarity with
19Karl Barth, The Holy Ghost and the Christian Life,
trans. R. Birch Hoyle" '(London: Frederick duller Limited"";
1938), p. 57.
18
the ground and goal of all that happens, of all things;
there man lives, in spite of all that is said to the
contrary, in the peace that passoth all understanding,
and which for that very reason is the light that lightens
our understanding.20
A more pronounced emphasis of man's existence in terms of
being absolutely dependent upon God's existence, is seen in
Barth. However, Barth would, like Kierkegaard, deny that
existence can be proven for anything outside of God and man.
He shares the "metaphysical skepticism" of Kierkegaard.
Barth also shares the Kierkegaardian idea of "becoming"
which is carried out in the reality of Christian experience.
Nothing is static or reduced to a fixed base for Barth. The
process and activity of existence are always present In the
decisiveness of life. This Is seen In the following passage
that speaks of the presence of the Holy Spirit :
� � � this presence has to be interpreted by us in the
esohatological sense : i.e. to say, as the presence of
the promise. Because God is revealed to us in our orea
turellness and sinfulness, w� receive the promise. The
only explanation of the promise given to us is, that as
His creatures we are real and that He la gracious to us,
pardoning us as sinners .21
This is brought out even more emphatically in Barth's state
ment which even speaks of the clcsing events of history as an
existential "becoming."
20Karl Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, trans. G. T.
Thomson (New York: PhilosophicaT"Llbrary , 1949), pp. 22, 26, 27.
21Barth, The Holy Ghost and the Christian Life, p. 75.
ID
... Ed the language of Ms time, and in Calvin's
own language, "end" does not only mean what comes last
and might be static, motionless, but what keeps man
company throughout the course of Ms life. End is thus
equivalent to "sense of life," "goal of life." It is
not a terminus to life: it Is a continuous action. And
this action is "to know Godj" it ia the primary end, but
not the only one.22
TMs means for Barth there la no future culmination for which
one statloly waits but that the existential experience brings
one into these events which are viewed by orthodoxy as off
in the coming future. Barth emphasizes this departure from
orthodoxy in the following statement ef sharp disagreement
which he makes regarding Augustine :
� . � This is the view of man as one existing in pre
supposed continuity with God. TMs view of continuity
between God and man ia always threatening to make man
out aa being hia own creator and atoner. We can now aay
that the whole of Augustlnlaniam� its doctrine of right
eousness as a quality infused into man, I.e. justifi
cation by works ( and in the last analysis these two
doctrines are one and the same)�would be tolerable and
feasible, if Augustine had but been interpreted as think
ing in eachatologlcal terms of thought. We cannot Inter
pret Mm in that way. It is only too plain that Ms
language there Is of a spirit of fulfilment In place of
the Spirit of Promise who is the Holy Ghost
In a similar manner, Kierkegaard broke with orthodoxy
becauae he believed their views to be full of pride and man's
attainments. Barth is like Kierkegaard in Ms reaction
against any view that might tend to comfort man witl. the
notion that he had arrived or attained in some concrete way.
2%arl Barth, The Faith of the Church, trans. Gabriel
Vahanian (Hew York: Meridian Boolca Inc., 1958), p. 25.
25Barth, The Holy Ghost and the Christian Life, pp. 73-74.
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In all Barth's theological Ideas one cannot help but
see the strong vein of Kierkegaardian existentialism. In
the following quotations, Barth explains the incarnation,
giving special attention to the existential "mystery" and
"content" over against the "form" and "miracle" of natural
history:
. . , But there is no question there of conception
and birth in general, but of a quite definite conception
and a quite definite birth. Why conception by the Holy
Spirit and why birth of the Virgin Mary? Why this
special miracle whioh is intended to be expressed In
these two concepts, side by side with the great miracle
of the Incarnation? Why does the miracle of Christmas
run parallel to the mystery of the Incarnation? A noetic
utterance is so to speak put alongside the ontic one. If
in the Incarnation we have to do with the thing, here w�
have to do with the sign. The two should not be confused.
The thing whioh is involved in Christmas ia true in and
for itself. But it is indicated, It ia unveiled In the
miracle of Christmas . But It would be wrong to conclude
from that, that therefore 'only' a sign is Involved,
which therefore might even be deducted from the mystery.
Let me warn you againat this. It ia rare in life to be
able to aeparate form and content .24
. . . What is involved la the mystery of the Incarna
tion as the visible form of which the miracle takes
place. We should 111 have understood Mark 2, If we want
ed so to read the passage, that the chief miracle was
the forgiveness of sins, and the bodily healing incident
al. The one thing obviously belongs of necessity to the
other. And so we should have to give a warning, too,
against parentheslaing the miracle of the natlvitas and
wanting to cling to the mystery aa such. One ''thing may
be definitely said, that every time people want to fly
from this miracle, a theology is at work, which has
ceased to understand and honour the mystery as well, and
has rather essayed to conjure away the mystery of the
unity of God and man In Jesus Christ, the mystery of
God's free grace,25
24Barth, Dogmatics In Outline, p. 96.
25 Ibid., p. 100.
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Hence, Berth like Kierkegaard sees no injustice to admit the
obvious miracles of nature, and then to relegate them to a
position of relative valuelessness by the application of the
existential postulate. This is illustrated in the following
excerpt from Barth:
... In precedence of all human existence, as the
a priori, goes the existence of Jesus Christ. That Is
what the Christian Confession of faith says. What Is
meant by this precedence of His? Do not let the idea of
a temporal precedence be prominent. That Is also there,
for it ia finished, there is that great historical per
fect, in whioh lordship was set up over us, in the years
1-30 in Palestine�but that ia not the decisive thing.
When the temporal precedence acquire the importance,
that la because the existence of this man precedes our
existence in virtue of Hia incomparable worth. He pre
cede a our existence in virtue of Hia authority over our
existence, in the power of His divinity.de
Regardless of how supernatural a thing may be, with
this theory of existence applied to It, it becomes divested
of its authoritative power. Barth has oarrled out in great
er detail this existential approach upon the various Christ-
Ian doctrines than did Kierkegaard, who atayed oloser to the
philosophical and psychological side of the diacussion. Per
haps the following statement with reference to Jesus Christ
and his relation to time and eternity will more pointedly
bear out Barth's capability at this point:
. . � But Jesus Christ sitteth beside the Father, aa
He who has suffered and has risen from the dead. That
Is the present. Jince He is present as God is present,
it already admits of being said that He shall come again
aa the person He once was. He who Is to-day just as He
26Ibid., p. 89
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was yesterday, will also be the same to-morrow� Jesus
Christ yesterday and to-day and the same to eternity.
Since Jesus Christ exists aa the person He was, obvious
ly He is the beginning of a new, different time from that
whioh we know, a time in which there is no fading away,
but real time which has a yesterday, a to-day and a to
morrow. But Jeaua Christ's yesterday is also His to-day
and Hia to-morrow. It la not tiraelessneas, not empty
eternity that comes In place of His time. His time is
not at an end; it continues in the movement from yester
day to to-day, into to-morrow. It ha� not the frightful
fleetingness of our present. When Jesus Christ sitteth
at the right hand of the Father, this existence of His
with G-od, His existence as the possessor and represent
ative of divine grace and power towards us men, has
nothing to do with what we are foolishly wont to con
ceive aa eternity�namely, an exiatence without time. If
this existence of Jesus Christ at the right hand of God
is real existence and as such the measure of all exist
ence, then it Is also existence in time, although in
another time than the one w� know. If the lordship and
rule of Jeaua Christ at the Father's right hand is the
meaning of what we see as the existence of our world
history and our life-history, then this existence of
Jesus Christ la not a timeless exiatence, and eternity
is not a timeless eternity. Death is timeless, nothing
ness is timeless. So we men are timeless when we are
without God and without Christ. Then we have no time.
But this timeleasneaa He has overcome, Christ hae time,
the fulness of time. He altteth at the right hand of
God as He who has come, who has acted and suffered and
triumphed in death. His session at Cod's right hand is
not the extract of this history? it is the eternal with
in thia history.27
Again being true to the Kierkegardian concept of exist
ence, Barth does not limit the scope of his application but
makes a total Inclusive sweep in the following!
Resurrection means eternity. Since it is the sover
eignty of God which gives significance to time, it Is
for that very reason not in time. It is not one tem
poral thing among others. What is In time has not yet
Ibid., pp. 129, 180.
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reached the boundary of death, has not yet been taken
under the government of God. It must yet die In order
to enter into life. The moment when the last trump Is
sounded, when the dead shall be raised and the living
shall be changed, is not the last moment of time, but is
time's teXoq, its nontemporal limit and end. It comes
Iv &T&uxtf, says Paul, In an indivisible, non-temporal,
eternal now. Is It yesterday, tomorrow, today? Is it
ever? Is It never? In each case we may answer Yes and
No. For, though our times are in God's hands, God's
times are not in ours. To everything there is a
but to everything there will also be an eternity.28
Barth gives the existential interpretation of heaven and
earth in the following quotations:
. � � Heaven is the creation inconceivable to man,
earth the creation conceivable to him. He himself is
the creature on the boundary between heaven and earth.
The covenant between God and man Is the meaning and the
glory, the ground and the goal of heaven and earth and
the whole creation.
� . . The world of man, the space for his existence
and his history, and at the same time man's natural goal
as well, 'to earth thou Shalt return': that is the earth.
If man does have another origin than this earthly one,
and another goal than that of returning to the earth
again, then It Is on the basis of the reality of the
covenant between God and man. We start talking of the
grace of God when we ascribe more to man than earthly
existence, in which Is included that the earth is under
heaven . There is no world of man In abstracto . It
would be an error If man were not oTear that his con
ceivable world Is bounded by an inconceivable one. Well
for ua that there are children and poets and philosophers
who are continually reminding us of this higher side of
Historical reality. The earthly world Is really only
one aide of creation. But in the heavenly as little as
in the earthly realm are we already in the realm of God;
28Karl Berth, The Word of God and the Word of Man
trans . Douglas Horton (Mas'sachusetts : The Migrim Press ,
1928), pp. 89, 90.
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and so the first and second commandments hold good:
'Thou shalt not make unto the� any Image nor any sort of
likeness, either of what is in heaven or of what is on
earth * � �' Neither on earth nor in heaven is there
any divine power which we have to love or to fear.29
The distinctions between heaven and earth, time and eternity,
are lost in the oblivion of the existential.
The Kierkegaard ian concept of "becoming" is very evi
dent in this statement of the Second Coming by Barth:
�
. � � From thence he shall come.' In this 'from
thence' Is contained above all this fact, that He will
issue out of the hiddenness in which He still remains
for us to-day, where He is proclaimed and believed by the
Church, where He is present to us only in His Word. The
New Testament says of this future coming that 'He shall
come on the clouds of heaven with great power and glory'
and 'as the lightning goeth out from East to West, so
shall be the coming of the Son of man.' These are meta
phors, but metaphors of ultimate realities, which at
least Indicate that it takes place no longer in secrecy
but is completely revealed. No one will any more be
able to deceive himself about this being reality. So He
will come. He will rend the heavens and stand before us
as the person He Is, sitting at the right hand of the
Father. He comes in the possession and in the exercise
of divine omnipotence. He comes as the One in whose
hands our entire existence is enclosed. Him we are ex
pecting, He is coming and He will be manifest as the One
whom we know already. It has all taken place; the only
thing wanting is that the covering be removed and all
may see it,30
It is surprising how even the final Judgment loses
its sting under the effect of the existential interpretation.
Barth puts into action this Kierkegaard ian method of erasing
the literal aspect in the following statement:
29Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, pp. 62, 63.
50Ibld., p. .133.
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In the Biblical world of thought the judge is not
primarily the one who rewards some and punishes the
other ; he Is the man who creates order and restores what
has been destroyed* ... To the seriousness of the
thought of judgment no injury will be done, for there it
will be manifest that God's grace and God's right are
the measure by which the whole of humanity and each man
will be measured. Vcnturua Judlcare : God knows every
thing that exists and happens! Then we may well be
terrified, and to that extent those visions of the Last
Judgment are not simply meaningless. That which is not
of God's grace and right cannot exist. Infinitely much
human as well as Christian 'greatness' perhaps plunges
there into the outermost darkness. That there is such a
divine No is indeed included in this Judlcare. But the
moment we grant this we must revert to the truth that the
Judge who puts some on the left and the others on the
right, is in fact He who has yielded Himself to the
Judgment of God for me and has taken away all malediction
from me.31
Prom these above excerpts out of Barth's writings, it
is easy to see the indebtedness of Barth to Kierkegaard's
existential thinking. From the expositions of these cardi
nal truths of the church by Barth, one has no difficulty In
crediting him with the efficient fulfillment of the task of
carrying Kierkegaard's thinking to its logical conclusions.
This has not all come about for Barth as a result of studying
the particulars of church dogma, but had its root beginning
in an existential view of the Bible aa such* Though this is
more fully discussed in the chapter under the heading, Para
dox and Truth, it Is mentioned briefly by the following
quotation in order to give the understanding necessary to
this discussion t
31 Ibid., pp. 135, 136.
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According to all that has been said, revelation is
originally and immediately, what the Bible and Church
proclamation are derivatively, and immediately, God's
Word, We said of Church proclamation, that from time to
time it must become God's Word. And we said the same of
the Bible, that it must from time to time become God's
Word. How "from time to time" had to do, not with human
experience (as if our being affected by this event and
our attitude to It could be constitutive of Its reality
and its oontentt) but, of course, with the freedom of
God's grace.38
Like Kierkegaard's existentialism, Barth's is also
constantly calling for the "new" in favor of casting away
the old, Barth like Kierkegaard was in reaction against the
extreme, humanistic emphasis of his time. This Kierkegaard Ian
conoept of "becoming" is constantly keeping society in a
state of flux and change where "revelation" is the only
determining factor for man. This Is well expressed by the
following excerpt from Barth:
The Holy Spirit makes a new heaven and a new earth
and, therefore, new men, new families, new relationships,
new politics. It has no respect for old traditions sim
ply because they are traditions, for old solemnities
simply because they are solemn, for old powers simply
because they are powerful. The Holy Spirit has respect
only for truth, for Itself. The Holy Spirit establishes
the righteousness of heaven in the midst of the unright
eousness of earth and will not step nor stay until all
that Is dead has been brought to life and a new world
has come into being.
0^Karl Barth, The Doctrine of the Word of God, Part I,
trans. G. T. Thomson (Vol. I of Church Dogmatics . 55 vols.j
Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1956), p. 131.
53Karl Barth, "The Strange New World Within the Bible,"
Contemporary Religious Thought, Thomas S. Kepler, editor
(New York, Nashville: Abingdon-Coke sbury Press, 1941), p. 141.
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Though this ie a more detailed discussion of the
effeot of Kierkegaard!an existentialism upon Barth, the
flavor of it will linger throughout the remaining areas under
discussion.
Subjectivity. Closely tied into the existential is the
subjective element. Here again Barth takes Kierkegaard ' s
thinking and makes the fullest practical application. It is
at this point that Kierkegaard labors long in many of his
writings. Though Barth does not go to the same extent in
his specific analysis of it as such, the impact of it can not
be avoided in any of Barth's writings .
Kierkegaard spoke much about the "passion" which la
eternal that exists within every individual. Thia motiva
ting, God given, and God controlled passion is again re
echoed in Barth and found in such passages as the following:
, � . Blood and tears, deepest despair and highest
hope, a passionate longing to lay hold of that which, or
rather of him who , overcomes the world because he is the
Creator and the Redeemer, its beginning and ending and
Lord, a passionate longing to have the word spoken, the
word which promises grace in judgment, life in death,
and the beyond In the here ana now, flod's word�this it
is which animates our church-goers , however lazy, bour
geois, or commonplace may be the manner in which they
express their want in so-called real life.34
Even when Barth writes about the revelation that is found
within the Bible, he leans heavily upon the subjective
�*Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man
pp. 108, 109.
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aspect of "passion." However, at this point Barth seems to
declare more strongly the absolute activity of God in the
move of passion toward faith. Where Kierkegaard takes great
pains to prove the activity of passion, Barth seems to accept
the fact and goes on to make such statements as the following!
... There is a spirit in the Bible that allows us to
stop awhile and play among secondary things as is our
wont�but presently it begins to press us on; and however
we may object that we are only weak, imperfect, and most
average folk, it presses us on to the primary fact,
whether we will or no. There is a river in the Bible
that carries us away, once we have entrusted our destiny
to it�away from ourselves to the sea. The Holy Script
ures will interpret themselves in spite of all our
human limitations. We need only dare to follow this
drive, this spirit, this river, to grow out beyond our
selves toward the highest answer. This daring is faith;
and we read the Bible rightly, not when we do so with
false modesty, restraint, and attempted sobriety, for
these are passive qualities, but when we read it in
faith. And the invitation to dare and to reach toward
ths highest, even though we do not deserve it, is the
expression of grace in the Bible: the Bible unfolds to
us as we are met, guided, drawn on, and made to grow by
the grace of God.35
At this point attention needs to be focused upon the
Barthian concept of the Holy Spirit, The subjective element
of Kierkegaard is applied by Barth at this point to such an
extreme as to make the Holy Spirit the personification of all
Christian experience. Barth Implies this in his remark
below :
. � � When men belong to Jesus Christ in such a way
that they have freedom to recognise His word as ad
dressed also to them, His work as done also for them,
the message about Him as also their task; and then for
35 Ibid., p. 54
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their part, freedom to hope for the best for all other
men, this happens, Indeed, as their human experience and
aotion, and yet not in virtue of their human capacity,
determination and exertion, but solely on the basis of
the free gift of God, in which all this is given to them.
In this giving and gift God Is the Holy Spirit.36
The above mention of "freedom" is a significant element for
Barth when he speaks of Christian experience, and by it he
always refers to the work of the Holy Spirit,
Barth also drives this Christian experience to such
an extremely subjective end as to eliminate all together the
objective evidences. Here again Kierkegaard preceded Earth
by stating that it was possible for people to be very much
Christian and never be detected as such by the objective eye.
Quite in agreement, Barth makes this extreme statement;
. � . Easter is indeed the great pledge of our hope,
but simultaneously this future is already present in the
Easter message. It is the proclamation of a victory
already won. The war Is at an end�even though here and
there troops are still shooting, because they have not
heard anything yet about the capitulation. The game is
won, even though the player can still play a few further
moves. Actually be is already mated. The clock has run
down, even though the pendulum still swings a few times
this way and that. It is in this interim space that we
are now living: the old is past, behold it has all be
come new. The Easter message tells that our enemies, sin,
the curse and death, are beaten. Ultimately they can no
longer start mischief. They still behave as though the
game were not decided, the battle not fought; we must
still reckon with them- but fundamentally we must cease
to fear them any more.37
TMs extreme subjectivity is supported by the concept that
56Barth, Dogmatics In Outline, p. 137.
37 Ibid., pp. 122, 123,
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the Holy Spirit embodies the total effect of the Christian
gospel. In Him it has already been accomplished due to the
Holy Spirit being posited as "subjective reality" In such
statements as the following:
The subjective reality of revelation consists in the
fact that we have our being through Christ and in the
Church, that we are the recipients of the divine test
imonies, and, as the real recipients of them, the child
ren of God, But the fact that we have this being is the
work of the Holy Spirit. Therefore the Holy Spirit is
the subjective reality of revelation.38
As Barth indicates in the following quotation, the Holy
Spirit is the sole operator within man's subjective existence
In which man has no activity:
We resume our study and inquire as to the signifi
cance for the Christian life of the Holy Ghost as the
"Finger of God," as the subjective aspect in the con
ception of revelation. The wonder of the love of God in
which we are made to participate by His Word passes
beyond His being the Creator, and is, moreover, His
fellowship with us, sinners though we be. And this is ?
the wonder of it: it la the wonder of His unmerited
mercy. In other words, it is something that we cannot
attribute to ourselves, not even In idea, as a quality
of our own spirit.39
It is necessary to see how Barth interprets the work
of the Holy Spirit in order to understand how he is applying
the Klerkegaardi an idea of the "moment." Like Kierkegaard,
Barth views God, in His arbitrary activity of the Holy
38Karl Barth, The Doctrine of the Word of God, Part II,
trans. G. T. Thomson ."larold KnighF~( vol. I of~7?hnrch Dog
matics. 5 vols.; lew York: Charles Ecribner's sons, 1956),
p. 242.
39Barth, The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life, p. 39.
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Spirit, as being completely responsible for the brief momenta
of divine revelation that dawn upon man's comprehension, thus
making man aware of what God has already accomplished in
subjective man. The following illustrates the application of
Kierkegaard's "existential moment" as found in Barth's sub
jective view of the Holy Spirit :
... It runs thus: then, and just then, when God wills
to be and is gracious to man and makes His grace manifest
to him. Therefore then, and just then, when God speaks
His Word to him, when Christ, as the Crucified and Risen
One, is present there for him, indeed on his behalf. We
can describe the same moment chosen by God,�the same
event taking place in God's freedom�as man's openness
or preparedness for God's grace, as his existence for
Christ, as his hearing God's Word. In saying this we
have not spoken of any of man's own autonomous actions.
But when we keep In view the subjective aspect of the
central concept of revelation, we have spoken then of the
special work of God the Spirit, of the wonder of the love
in the outpouring of the Holy^Ghost. When revelation
takes place, the HoTy Ghost la , according to a figure of
speech much cherished In the ancient Church, "the finder
of God by whom we are sanctified." He la the Paraclete
who is not only speaking on our behalf, but speaking to
us so that we have to hear Him, the speaking God. For It
does not enter into consideration that we somehow open,
prepare and equip ourselves for taking part in this event
at all. The fundamental significance of the Holy Ghost
for the Christian life is, that this, our participation
in the occurrence of revelation, is just our being grasp
ed in his occurrence which is the effect of Divine
action.4"
Hence, man is moved along his highway of "passion" on to the
experience of the "moment" through absolutely no initiative
of his own. This is Kierkegaardian through and through.
Like Kierkegaard, Barth is universal in his inclusion
Ibid.., pp. 18-20.
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of all men in the subjective work of the Holy Spirit, Both
men come very olose to replacing the human spirit with the
Holy Spirit, These Ideas are supported in Barth's statement:
When we spoke of faith, we stressed the concept of
freedom. Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is free
dom. If we wish to paraphrase the mystery of the Holy
Spirit It is best to choose this concept. To receive
the Spirit, to have the Spirit, to live in the Spirit
means being set free and being permitted to live in free
dom. Not all men are free. Freedom Is not a matter of
course and is not simply a predicate of human existence.
All men are destined to freedom, but not all are in this
freedom. Where the line of separations runs Is hidden
from us men. The Spirit bloweth where He listeth. It
is indeed not a natural condition of man for him to have
the Spirit; it will always be a distinction, a gift of
God. What matters here is, quite simply, belonging to
Jesus Christ. We are not concerned in the Holy Spirit
with something different from Him and new. It was
always an erroneous conception of the Holy Spirit, that
so understood Him. The Holy Spirit is the Spirit of
Jesus Christ. 'Of mine He shall take and give to you.'
The Holy Spirit is nothing else than a certain relation
of the Word to man. In the outpouring of the Holy Spirit
as Whitsun, there is a movement - -pneuma means wind�from
Christ to man. He breathed on them: 'Receive ye the
Holy Ghost I ' Christians are those breathed upon by Christ.
Therefore we can never In one respect speak soberly
enough of the Holy Spirit. What is involved is the par
ticipation of man in the word and work of Christ.4*
It must be remembered that the "freedom" spoken of refers to
the enlightenment found in the "existential moment," to use
Kierkegaard's phrase, or the "revelation," to use Barth's
term.
Barth's extreme subjectivism causes him to frown on
any objective manifestations of a Christian experience. He
4iBarth, Dogmatics in Outline, p. 138
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agrees with Kierkegaard's thought that everyman is a lone
pilgrim who oan be of very little objective help to anyone
else's Christian experience. The Christian should not try
to paint in word or deed a pioture or even an idea of Christ
but simply point to Christ. The witness of revelation is
such a subjective element, for Barth, as to make all human
efforts of witnessing seem like idolatry.42 Hence, the in
evitable quest of man for God is not satisfied by his own
efforts or by the efforts of other men, because man is total
ly dependent upon the arbitrary disposition of an absolutely
transcendent God who will tell man, when Be gets ready, what
He has already done for man.
Though Barth spends much time explaining the tradi
tional concepts of Christianity, his subjective view brings
him around to much the same conclusions that Kierkegaard had
reached. That is, Christian experience in its practical
application becomes little more than a supreme inner adjust
ment to a constantly changing world.
As the existential and the subjective infiltrate the
whole of Kierkegaard ian theology so they infiltrate the
whole of Barth's theology. The subjective element, espe
cially, Is again prominent in the chapter dealing with faith.
42 Ibid., pp. 93, 94
CHAPTER III
SIN AND SUFFERING
At this point is found the darkest part of Kierke
gaard's theology. Also it must be remembered that a theo
logian's view of sin is always very basic to his whole
theology. How a man defines sin , determines the nature and
extent of salvation necessary to atone for that sin. The
evaluation of sin even effects one's appreciation of a Saviour.
In fact, the whole plan of salvation is involved in the de
finition of sin and the effect of that sin upon man.
I. SIN AND SUFFERING AS FOUND WITHIN
KIERKEGAARD'S WRITING
Sin. Unless one takes Kierkegaard's view of sin by
steps, it will be difficult to adjust one's thinking at this
point. Extreme caution must be used that a strict orthodox
meaning is not given to many of the words Kierkegaard uses.
For Kierkegaard Is very adept at taking orthodox expressions
that have become quite traditional and making them fit into
his thinking. This means that usually an unfamiliar meaning
is affixed to the word or expression which, If not properly
understood, will greatly confuse the reader.
This progressive understanding begins by a brief
acquaintance with Kierkegaard's meaning of innocence. In
35
his own words j
Innocence is ignorance. In his Innocence man is not
determined as spirit but is soullshly determined In im
mediate unity with his natural condition. Spirit is
dreaming in man. This view is in perfect accord with
that of the Bible, and by refusing to ascribe to man in
the state of innocence a knowledge of the difference be
tween good and evil It condemns all the notion of merit
Catholicism has imagined.
In this state there is peace and repose; but at the
same time there Is something different, which Is not dis
sension and strife, for there is nothing to strive with.
What la It then? Nothing. But what effort does nothing
produce? It begets dread. This ia the profound secret
of Innocence, that at the same time it is dread.
Thia innooence is lost by the knowledge of sin which la
guilt. Guilt actually argues for a previous state of inno
cence aays Kierkegaard in the following: MAs Adam lost inno
oence by guilt, so does every man lose It. If it was not by
guilt he lost It, neither was it innocence he lost; and if
he was not Innocent before he became guilty, he never became
guilty."2
This state of dreadful, innocent ignorance drives men
to seek the knowledge of sin. The following explains this
inoeptlon of dread that leads in turn to a knowledge of sin.
One must not confuse thia with the idea of "paasion" pre
viously diaousaed, though they do appear parallel. Pasaion
drivea men to eternal happiness, while dread drives men to
-SeVen Kierkegaard, Concept of Dread, trans. 'Walter
Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), pp. 37, 38.
2 Ibid., p, 32.
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sin's knowledge.
Innocence still Is, but one word suffices, and with
that ignorance is concentrated. Innocence of course
cannot understand this word; but dread has as it were
obtained its first prey; instead of nothing innocence
gets an enigmatic word. So when it is related in Gen
esis that God said to Adam, "Only of the tree of tne
knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat,B it is a
matter of course that Adam did not understand this word.
For how could he have understood the difference between
good and evil, seeing that this distinction was in fact
consequent upon the enjoyment of the fruit?
When one assumes that the prohibition awakens the de
sire, one posits a knowledge instead of ignorance; for
Adam would have had to have a knowledge of freedom, since
his desire was to use it. The explanation therefore an
ticipates what was subsequent . The prohibition alarms
Adam [induces a state of dread] because the prohibition
awakens in him the possibility of freedom. That which
passed innocence by as the nothing of dread has now en
tered into him, and here again It is a nothing, the
alarming possibility of being able . What it Is he is
able to do, of that he has no conception; to suppose that
he had some conception is to presuppose, as commonly Is
done, what came later, the distinction between good and
evil. There ia only the possibility of being able, as a
heightened expression of dread, because this in a more
profound aenae is and is not, because in a more profound
sense he loves it and flees from it.3
Thia la difficult to understand, but one muat remember
that Kierkegaard doea not think of sin in terms of simple
acts of disobedience to God's lawa, but as a psychological
activity which has this preceding state of innocence and
dread, whioh then leads to guilt. This is the reason that
referenoe is made to the knowledge of sin, rather than the
committing of sin, In Kierkegaard, very little discussion
5Ibid . , p. 40
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is given to law and commandments as these are thought of In
orthodoxy, Man's fall is in terms of a psychological con
flict that every individual encounters, termed by Kierkegaard
as the "qualitative lead," In the following analysis he
argues for this preceding state to the qualitative leap:
. . , Sin is not first immediacy, sin is a later
immediacy. By sin the individual Is already higher (in
the direction of the demoniacal paradox) than the uni
versal, because it is a contradiction on the part of the
universal to Impose Itself upon a man who lacks the
conditio sine quo non. If philosophy among other vagar-
ies were also to have the notion that it could occur to
a man to act in accordance with Its teaching, one might
make out of that a queer comedy. An ethics which dis
regards sin is a perfectly idle science; but if it
asserts sin, it is eo Ipso well beyond itself. Philos
ophy teaches that tEe Immediate must be annulled. That
is true enough; but what is not true In this is that sin
Is as a matter of course the immediate, for that Is no
more true than that faith as a matter of course Is the
immediate.4
How it becomes necessary to see how Kierkegaard's
concept of sin is conjoined with the sexual. For this fall
of every man into the knowledge of sin has for Kierkegaard a
twofold consequence: that sin came into the world, and that
sexuality was posited. Note his argument:
Sinfulness then is not senuousness, not by any means;
but without sin there is no sexuality, and without sex
uality no history, A perfect spirit has neither the one
nor the other, hence also the sexual difference is an
nulled in the resurrection, and hence too no angel has
history. Even though the archangel Michael had recorded
all the missions on which he was sent and whioh he per
formed, this nevertheless is not his history. The syn-
4S0ren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Walter
Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945), p. 152.
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thesis is first posited in the sexual as a contradiction,
but at the same time, like every contradiction, as a
task, the history of which begins that very Instant.
This is the actuality which is preceded by the possibil
ity of freedom. But the possibility of freedom does not
consist in being able to choose the good or the evil.
Such thoughtlessness has as little support in the Script
ure as in philosophy. Possibility means I can. In a
logioal system it is convenient enough to-say that possi
bility passes over into actuality. In reality It is not
so easy, and an intermediate determinant is necessary.
This intermediate determinant is dread, which no more
explains the qualitative leap than It justifies It eth
ically. Dread Is not determinant of necessity, but
neither is It of freedom; it is a trammeled freedom,
where freedom Is not free in itself but trammeled, not by
necessity but in itself. If sin has come into the world
by neeesaity . . � then there is no dread. If ain has
come into the world by an act of abstract llberum
arbitrlum . . . , neither in thia case is there dread.
To want to explain logically the entrance of sin into the
world la a stupidity Which oould only occur to people
who are comically anxious to get an explanation.5
What he is actually aaylng is, that sexuality and history,
though not themselves sinful, come as a result of sin which
comes as a result of the poasibllity of freedom. Beyond this
he makes no attempt to find sin's origin.
Though Kierkegaard, as every theological thinker, can
go only so far in determining the origin of sin, yet his
view of original sin is stated very definitely. For him sin
does not stem from the acts of life so much aa It does from
fear; It is thought of as a psychological event arising from
dread or anxiety. Despair, a universal condition, Is roughly
the equivalent of sin. Kierkegaard explains the sinner in
Kierkegaard, Concept of Dread, pp. 44, 45.
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these words:
Let us now �all the untruth of the individual Sin*
Viewed eternally he cannot be sin, nor can he be eTernal
ly presupposed as having been in sin. By coming into
existence therefore (for the beginning was that subjec
tivity is untruth), he becomes a sinner. He is not born
as a sinner in the sense that he is presupposed as being
a sinner before he is born, but he is born In sin and as
a sinner. This we might call original sin.6
Again it is important to note the distinction between ortho-
dox 'original sin' and this theory of Kierkegaard's. He does
not hold that Adam's sin conditions sinfulness as a condition.
To say that Adam's sin brought on original sin would be to
say, for Kierkegaard, that Adam is outside the race, and that
his sin was worse than all other men's sins. He feels that
every man brings sin into the world by his own first sin.
He argues that if Adam's sin brought the condition of sin
upon all men then Adam, being outside the race, caused the
race to really begin outside of Itself, which is quite con
trary to every rational concept. This makes descent a mere
carrying on of the racial species, which descent gives man a
history but does not generate upon him the past events.7
Nevertheless, Kierkegaard does allow In the following quota
tion that there is a certain condition whioh is akin to
6Se/ren Kierkegaard, Coneluding Unscientific Post
script, trans. David P. Swenson and waiter Lowrie (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 186.
'Kierkegaard, Concept of Dread, p. 27.
40
"original sins"
In the foregoing I have several times called atten
tion to the faot that the view presented in this work
does not deny the propagation of sinfulness through gen
eration; I have only said that sinfulness moves by
quantitative determinants, whereas sin oomes in constant
ly by the qualitative leap of the individual. Here one
can already see one significance of the quantitative
process of generation. Eve is the derived being. True,
she is created like Adam, but she is created out of a
precedent creature. True, she is Innocent like Adam, but
there is as it were a presentiment of a disposition which
indeed is not yet in existence, yet may seem like a hint
of the sinfulness posited by reproduction. It is the
fact of being derived which predisposes the Individual,
without for all that making him guilty.8
In the midst of the fine and difficult distinction, it must
be recalled that Kierkegaard did not believe that the under
standing of this sin problem could be learned from another,
but that everyone must learn for himself In his own state of
existential progress. Only the science of psychology, he
9
said, could help a little bit.
At this point, it is not hard to see that, for Kierk
egaard, entrance into the kingdom is made as difficult as
possible, because a man, by himself, must come to conceive
of this psychological sin. Sin is hidden within human na
ture, and does not stem from carnal or Adami c nature. Thus
redemption is a fresh beginning which breaks with the past
and man's old self, and man's best Is in as much need of
forgiveness as his worst.
Ibid., pp. 42, 43. *lbid., p. 46.
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Into this pioture Kierkegaard does bring what he terms
as the "Infinite movement of repentance." This implies a
complete break with the temporal world where the "return to
reality" Is the restoration of one's state of Innocence. To
repent is to recognize the presence of sin and give testi
mony to the fact that the ethical has been violated. By sin
ning, one places himself beyond the ethical where restoration
to innocence is ethically impossible. This repentance is
never to cease beoause man's best Is nothing but sin and
only repentance will keep one in a loving relationship to
God . Where this repentance leaves off, the religious para
dox begins, i.e., tne atonement and its correlative faith*
Hence, for Kierkegaard, repentance is merely a state of re
cognizing sin or the Bin-personality of man. Consequently
he says, "For this reason he who believes the atonement Is
greater than the one who repents most deeply."*0 This matter
of believing is treated at length In a later section of this
chapter.
Suffering. Closely entwined in Kierkegaard's theory
of sin is his idea of suffering which again adds to the
gloom of his thinking. For him suffering is not just a
*�Reidar Thomte, Kierkegaard ' s Philosophy of Religion
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948), p *T5, citing
Kierkegaard, Paplrer, IV A p. 116.
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matter Involving those who lustfully Indulge in the activi
ties of sin, but it is also a vital part of the "becoming
Christian." Any relation of finite man to the infinite, ab
solute God is one of suffering because of the vast irrecon
cilability of the two, which can only be spanned by divine
intervention through the absolute revelation of Christ.
It is vitally Important to understand that for Kier
kegaard this suffering not only has several facets such as:
guilt, pathos, dread, and despair, but that suffering is a
continuous thing for the religious experience. Suffering la
the essential criterion of the religious life because as man
stands related to God in an absolute decisive manner, he is
unable to find any decisive external expression for this.
Thus there is always a certain degree of suffering for man in
his relation to an absolute God. However, this Buffering is
never external or ascetic as the case of the monastic. It
must always be subjeotive "soul suffering."11
Suffering la activated as man, in an effort to hold
a relationship with God, renounces the relativity and the
Immediacy of this present world in favor of the conception
of God or an eternal happiness. Man Is brought to seek his
eternal happiness by the extremely compelling force of
pathos whioh comes as a result of seeing the "either/or" in
^Thomte, on. cit., p. 90, citing Kierkegaard, Con
cluding Unscientific l="o8*tscript , pp. 388, 446,
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life, in other words* as man is confronted with the choice
between good and evil, he senses certain spiritual suffer
ing. This pathos for eternal happiness must be allowed to
cause man to choose the good Instead of the evil. Hence
extreme pathos comes as a result of the eternal recollection
of guilt which as has been previously mentioned, Is that
which results from the knowledge of sin in general, not from
the particular acts of sin.
Though man may be forgiven of his sin he can never
really escape the pressing guilt of it. However, to be for
given he must first experience a feeling of being a sinner
which is profound suffering* It Is pure pain to stand open
ly before God's exposing and sentencing eyes. Kierkegaard
says, "The more clearly the conception of guilt stands out,
the greater is the pain, the less profound the sorrow.*1*2
Hence the sinner must try to understand his predicament of
sin, in order that he may experience most fully the guilt
which will motivate a humble drawing unto God.
It ia at this point of sin where we see the import
ance of suffering for Kierkegaard. This suffering of the
guilty soul never ends, but becomes a crucible of affliction
to prove the gold of existential seriousness In our beliefs.
Kierkegaard explains:
*2S^ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, I, trans. David P.
Swenson and Lillian Marvin Sweneon TPrinceton: Princeton
University Press, 1944), p. 120.
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But suffering as the essential expression for existen
tial pathos means that suffering is real, or that the
reality of the suffering constitutes the existential
pathos*; and by the reality of this suffering is meant its
persistence as essential for the pathetic relationship
to an external happiness,13
The eternal reoolleotion of guilt, producing extreme pathos,
becomes the highest expression of the existential man.
This discussion of pathos and guilt gives a basic un
derstanding of the more evident suffering whioh Is so com
mon to all men. However, there Is another even more funda
mental form of suffering than these whioh again all men
experience, although it is not nearly so apparent. Kierke
gaard calls this 'the concept of dread.1 Actually this
comes very close to the orthodox idea of original sin, though
it is considered in terms of psychological malady rafcher
than as a polluted nature.
Dread goes back to the very beginning of man. It is
found within the innocent man as the longing that caused man
to seek the knowledge of sin. However, dread has never
appeared again in the same form that it did to Adam, "Con
sequently that dread of his had now acquired two analogous
expressions; objective dread in nature, and subjective
dread in the individual�of which two the latter contains a
more and the former a less than that dread In Adam.**14 Fer-
'Kierkegaard , Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 396.
Kierkegaard, Concept of Dread, p, 54.
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haps It would help to realize that Kierkegaard defines
dread as ". � .a quality of the dreaming spirit, and as
such it has its plaoe in psychology." Also, "Dread Is a
sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy."15 Thus
dread is the reality of freedom as possibility anterior to
possibility. This is not fear, but more closely, longing�
a longing whioh leads man to his pattern of sin, guilt, pa
thos, despair and finally faith. Kierkegaard explains it:
Thus dread is the dizziness of freedom which occurs
when the spirit would posit the synthesis, and freedom
then gazes down Into its own possibility, grasping at
finiteness to sustain Itself. In this dizziness freedom
succumbs. Further than this psychology cannot go and
will not. That very instant everything is changed, and
when freedom rises again it sees that it is guilty. Be
tween these two Instants lies the leap, which no science
had explained or can explain. He who becomes guilty In
dread becomes as ambiguously guilty as it is possible to
be. Dread is a womanish debility in which freedom
swoons. Psychologically speaking, the fall into sin al
ways occurs in impotence. But dread is at the same time
the most egoistic thing, and no concrete expression of
freedom is so egoistic as is the possibility of every
concretion. This again Is the overwhelming experience
which determines the Individual's ambiguous relation,
both sympathetic and antipathetic. In dread there is the
egoistic infinity of possibility, which does not tempt
with its sweet anxiety ... 10
Whether man is in the state of innocence or guilt,
dread is the longing which announces man's desire for de
liverance, "So then dread signifies two things: the dread
In which the individual posits sin by the qualitative leap}
like a definite
16lbld. , p. 55.
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and the dreed which entered in along with sin, and which for
thia reason comes alao into the world quantitatively every
time an individual poaits Bin."17 Hence, Kierkegaard follows
up with this statement which defines these two diatinctiona
of dread:
It might be more aerviceable to note that objective
dread Is here contrasted with subjective dread, and that
this is a distinction whioh could not have been made in
Adam's state of innocence. Taken in the strictest sense,
subjective dread is the dread posited in the individual
aa the consequence of his sin. ... But when the term
is taken in this sense, the contrast with an objective
dread vanishes, since dread manifests itself precisely
as that which it is, namely- the subjective. The dis
tinction between the subjective and the objective dread
had its place therefore in the contemplation of the
world and of the state of innocence of the later indi
vidual. The division occurs here in such a way that
subjective dread designates what exists in the innocence
of the individual, an innocence which corresponds to that
of Adam and yet is quantitatively different by reason of
the quantitative Increment due to generation. By objec
tive dread, on the other hand, we understand the reflec
tion in the whole world of the sinfulness whioh ia pro
pagated by generation.*8
Again it ia important to see that for Kierkegaard the effects
of sin in nature and in the physical are generated but not
the polluted nature of man's peraonality which Is called "the
bent to sinning." Rather, for Kierkegaard, every man haa
his own fall In Eden due to the longing of dread that sees
the possibility of freedom that will lead to the knowledge
of sin.
17 Ibid., p. 49. 18lbid . , pp. 50, 51.
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Since sinfulness moves by quantitative increments, so
dread also. The consequence of original sin or of its
presence in the individual is dread, whioh only quanti
tatively is different from that of Adam. In the state of
innocence, and of that we may speak in the case of the
later man, original sin must have the ambiguity out of
which guilt breaks forth in the qualitative leap. On the
other hand, dread in the later individual can possibly
be more reflective than In Adam, beoause the quantitative
Increment accumulated by the race now makes itself felt
In him. Dread, however, is no more than it was before an
lmperfeotlon in man; on the contrary, one may say that
the more primitiveness a man has, the deeper In the
dread, because the presupposition of sinfulness which
bis individual life supposes, since he enters indeed into
the history of the race, must be appropriated. Sinful
ness has thus acquired a great power, and original sin
Is growing.*9
Upon this same ground Kierkegaard would argue that sensual
ity has become synonymous with sin but that in the beginning
it was not so. Man has made it such by his own continual
positing of 8 in.
Mention has been made of this great cloud of suffer
ing incurred by humanity through dread. However, dread is
not the total pioture of suffering, though it does over
shadow all of man's life. Dread leads man into the explora
tion of the possibilities of sin's knowledge. As man ex
plores with his reason, he Is brought to the point of despair
through being unable to answer his predicament logically.
This despair is also a part of man's continual suffering
experience In this world.
Though some other Implications of this despair are
Itil.. ?. 47.
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discussed in the section on faith, here the suffering side
of it needs to be viewed. It is not hard to see how a man
suffers over the despair of not knowing his way out of con
demnation. However, for Kierkegaard, a man is found to be
in despair in at least three ways. "Despair is a sickness
in the spirit. In the self, and so it may assume a triple
form: in despair at not being conscious of having a self
(despair improperly so called); in despair at not willing to
be oneself; in despair at willing to be oneself."20 He even
goes on to say that the state of being unaware of despair is
actually one form of despair. So no man can ever completely
get away from despair, which is thus illustrated in the
following:
Just as the physician might say that there lives not
one single man who is in perfect health, so one might
say perhaps that there lives not one single man who after
all is not to some extent in despair. . . .At any rate
there has lived no one and there lives no one outside of
Christendom, unless he be a true Christian, and If he la
not quite that, he is somewhat in despair after all.'21
II. SIN AND SUFFERING AS FOUND WITHIN
BARTH'S WRITING
Though both Kierkegaard and Barth are in agreement
with each other in the major thrust of these ideas of aln
* Seren Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, trans.
Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951),
p. 17.
21 Ibid., p. 38.
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and suffering, yet a variation of emphasis is apparent at
some points. The mode of expression is often the greatest
difference, rather than the ba3ic theory.
Sin, In the area of sin, Barth holds the same gen
eral concept as Kierkegaard, but each man starts from a dif
ferent point of discussion, Kierkegaard begins in an attempt
to search out the beginning of sin. Barth begins with the
proposition that sin can only be known by the Word of God,
� , . m general terms it is true enough that the
knowledge of God alone includes within Itself the know
ledge of sin, and that this knowledge arises only in
the confrontation of man by the majesty and holiness of
God,88
Going on from here Barth brings out his reasoning in which
his theory of the "Word of God" is so basic:
* � .The incline obviously begins at the point where
we think we have to create the message of sin from some
other source than that of the message of Jesus Christ*
This forces us to ask for an independent normative con
cept, and to move forward to the construction of it, and
we fall at once into the whole arbitrary process. The
root of the arbitrariness is the belief that we can and
should try to escape the one true word of God In this
matter. And why should we not avoid the mistake at the
point where it begins? What reason Is there for that
first belief that the doctrine of sin must precede
Chris tology and therefore be worked out independently
of it?23
However, both men arrive at the same conclusion regarding
227iarl Barth, The Doctrine of Reconciliation, Part _I,
trans, G, W. Bromiley (Vol. IV of ClFmroh Dogmatics. 5 vols"**;
New Yorkj Charles Scribner's Sons, 195^), p. 363*"
23 lbId. , p. 389.
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the meaning of Adam and the beginning of sin at the fall,
. . , Who is Adam? ... He simply did in the Insig
nificant form of the beginning that whioh all men have
done after him, that whioh is In a more or less serious
and flagrant form our own transgression. He was In a
trivial form what we all are, a man of sin, � . . This
does not mean that he has bequeathed it to us as his
heirs so that we have to be as he was. He has not poison
ed us or passed on a disease.24
This fall Is not the bringing of sin into the world, it is
Just an example of how sin enters each individual,
, � , The fall of man comes In and with the pride of
man. He falls In exalting himself where he ought not to
try to exalt himself, where, according to the grace of
God, he might in humility be freely and truly man,25
. . . The sin of human pride in the relationship of
man with God is a failure and repudiation of this kind,
and as such it Is the guilt or debt of man. He is not
forced to commit this sin. As we have seen, there is no
reason for It, All that we can say is that he does
commit It.*6
Where Kierkegaard spends a great deal of time talking about
"innocence," the "dread" of innocence and "the knowledge of
sin" which these inevitably lead to, Barth assumes all of
this with a question mark and says:
. � � That man is evil, that he is at odds with God
and his neighbor, and therefore with himself, is some
thing which he cannot know of himself, by communing with
himself, or by conversation with Ms fellow-man, any
more than he can know in this way that he Is Justified
and comforted by God.27
Barth maintains that the Imperfection and the problematical
Ibid., p. 509. Ibid., p. 478
Ibid., pp. 484, 485. 27Ibld., pp. 359, 360.
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nature of man's existence Is not as such his sin but only
his limitations. . . Only when we know Jesus Christ do
we really know that man is the man of sin, and what sin is,
and what it means for man . "28 Though Kierkegaard would hold
that man does have a knowledge of sin, the two men are more
closely agreed upon the extent into whioh man goes in sin and
the state of sin in which man lives. Barth describes these
In the following words :
. . .however we may describe the fallen being of man,
we cannot say that man is fallen completely away from
God, in the sense that he is lost to Him or that he has
perished. It is true that the fall of man means that in
his being there has opened up the gulf or vacuum of
nothingness in the world which God created good .29
. . � And man himself is none other than the one he
always was In relation to God, sharing the same crea-
turely being and capacity. The only difference is that
under the authority of the Word of God and in possession
of his human capacity he is condemned to exist before
God as the one who resists, in an overthrowal of the
covenant-relationship and therefore in an overthrowal of
his relationship as a creature to the Creator. God still
says Yes to him, but this now means, that because he
does not hear it he will not thankfully rejoice in it
but can only hear the Yes as a destructive No.30
All this defining of sin's origin serves to make sin
In its more practical aspect little more than a psycholog
ical malady, which is exactly the point at which Kierkegaard
arrives in his reasoning. Barth is quite plain in his state
ment of this:
28Ibld.. p. 589. 29 lb id., p, 480. g0Ibid., p. 482.
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, . . It Is true that in relation to all theae ele
ments of his nature the man of sin becomes someone other
than himself, that his nature is altered in all its ele
ments when he commits sin. It is also true that his
nature, he himself, Is not destroyed and does not dis
appear when he becomes someone other than himaelf and
his nature is altered. It la also true that the man of
sin Is not stronger than his Creator, that he cannot
create another nature than that which God gave him and
become a different being beoause of his sin. Even when
he does evil, he Is still hi; self , the good creature of
God.31
This does not mean that sin does not receive judgment and
punishment or that sin does not bring guilt and condemna
tion.32 But beoause the concept of sin ia ao intangible,
these concepts also lose their extreme application. They
aiirply are expressed in terms of a wounded or fractured re
lationship to God.
Barth defines sin in the following statements, which
are very close to Kierkegaard's thinking:
, , . Sin, in itself, is obviously never at all this
or that act, on which one could lay his finger: but it
is solely resistance to God's law, oppoaition to His
graoious pronouncement of acquittal and guilt.33
... In the sphere where the term "sin" ia ambiguous,
i.e. in the sphere of our own inner and outer action,
there is no doubt but that we can acquire a relative
ainlessness and righteouaneas . What cornea closer to us
than our self-esteem as regards this? And it is just
31Ibid., p. 406.
32Karl Barth, Christ and Adam, trans. T. A. Small
(New York: Harper And Brothers FuoTFshers, 1952), pp. 58, 39.
33Barth, The Holy Ghoat and the Christian Life, trans.
R. Birch Hoyle (London: PredericF"MuTTer Linlted, 1938 ) , p . 45 .
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this self-reliance and self-presumption with regard to
this relative slnlessness and righteousness, using it as
a safeguard against the accusations made by God's Word;
this refusal to be of those who have always to live by
God's forgiving mercy: this is unbelief: this is really
sin. In comparison with this sin, all the rest do not
matter so much, for this unbelief is the most critical
sin of all sins.34
Hence, for Barth as for Kierkegaard, the worst sin a man can
commit is to try to "do" something that will help his own
salvation from sin. Here Barth is even more pronounced than
Kierkegaard. For Kierkegaard did allow that there was some
small bit of resigning that man might do in ridding himself
of worldly impressions. Barth leans to an utter passivity
of man's efforts,
, , . No psalm-singing to the glory of God and no
lowly knee-bending can alter the fact that when God's
grace and man ' s doing are looked upon as two sides of an
affair, where one can turn it round and say , instead of
the words "Holy Ghost," with Just as good emphasis.
"religious fervour," "moral earnestness," or even "man's
creative activity ."�then it is a simple fact that man
has been handed over and left to his sins.
. . .But all this talk of theirs about "the gravity
of sin" does not alter the fact one Jot, that serious
sins are not being spoken of by them. For we can as
little think of such sins being easily removed as think
of curing a corpses as little think them removed, as
little as we can remove them, as matter of fact. A dead
person can only be raised, resurrected, and grave sin
can only be forgiven . And we cannot make this removal
evident in tne figure of a changing of man's attitude,
as this is sketched so significantly for Augustine's
doctrine of Justification or even Karl Eoll's. We are
34 Ibid., P# 46.
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compelled to believe this as God's aotion, without our
seeing it.35
This element of passivity pervades Barth's whole con-
oept of forgiveness. Yet this does not essentially change
the nature of forgiveness from what Kierkegaard also arrives
at. Neither Barth nor Kierkegaard ever spends time worrying
about man being lost in terms of a literal hell. The reason
Is found in this statement by Barth:
. . .By God interceding for man�the New Testament
writers were not afraid to use the expression 'paying'�
man is a ransomed creature. 'ArcoXvTpwatQ is a legal
concept which described the ransoming of a alave. The
goal is that man is transferred to another status in
law. He no longer belongs to that Which had a right over
him, to that realm of curse, death and hell; he Is trans
lated into the kingdom of God's dear Son. That means
that his position, hia condition, his legal status aa a
sinner is rejected in every form. Man is no longer seri
ously regarded by God as a sinner. Whatever he may be,
whatever there la to be 8aid of him, whatever he haa to
reproach himBelf with, God no longer takes him seriously
as a sinner. He has died to sin; there on the Gross of
Golgotha. He is no longer present for sin. He is ac
knowledged before God and established as a righteous
man, aa one who does right before God. As he now stands,
he had, of course, hia exiatence in sin and so in ita
guilt; but he has that behind him. The turn has been
achieved, once for all. But we cannot say, 'I have
turned away once for all, I have experienced'�no; 'once
for all' is Jesus Christ's 'once for all'. But If we
believe in Him, then It holds for us. Man is in Christ
Jesus, who has died for him, in virtue of His Resurrec
tion, God's dear child, who may live by and for the good
pleasure of God. 36
Even more extreme than this is the universal! sm which seems
35 Ibid., pp. 35, 36, 38,
35Karl Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, trans. G. T.
Thomson (New York: PhiloaophIcar~LIbrary, 1949), pp. 121, 122,
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clear In the teachings of Barth whioh strips Judgment of all
its poignant effect. Again Barth Is found to be stating this
oase much more definitively than Kierkegaard, yet he Is in
perfect agreement with Kierkegaard's concept of "existential
suffering" and "eternal life,"
But actually we are looking away beyond Good Friday,
when w� say that God comes in our place and takes our
punishment upon Himself. Thereby He actually takes It
away from us. All pain, all temptation, as well as our
dying, is Just the shadow of the Judgment which God has
already executed in our favour. That which in truth was
bound to affect us and ought to have affected us, has
actually been turned aside from us already in Christ's
death. That is attested by Christ's saying on the Cross,
'It is finished.' So then in view of Christ's Cross we
are invited on the one hand to realise the magnitude and
weight of our sin in what our forgiveness cost. In the
strict sense there is no knowledge of sin exoept in the
light of Christ's Cross, For he alone understands what
sin is, who knows that his sin is forgiven him. And on
the other hand we may realize that the price la paid on
our behalf, so that we are acquitted of sin and its
consequences. We are no longer addressed and regarded
by God as sinners, who must pas a under judgment for
their guilt. We have nothing more to pay. We are ac
quitted gratis, sola gratia, by God's own entering in
for us.5"
Again it must be noticed that sin's forgiveness is
more akin to the psychological adjustment in Barth. This is
like Kierkegaard's idea of the "return to reality."
... His forgiveness makes good our repudiation and
failure and thus overcomes the hurt that we do to God,
and the disturbance of the relationship between Himself
and us, and the disturbance of the general relationship
between the Creator and creation. His forgiveness repels
chaos, and closes the gulf, and ensures that the will of
57Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, p. 119, 120.
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God will bo done on earth as it is in heaven �dH
Before leaving the subject of sin, one must mention
more specifically original sin. Barth, like Kierkegaard,
denies this to be a reality, yet again like Kierkegaard, he
makes statements which imply a vague attachment of the human
race to Adam that is like the relation of original sin:
, . . When Paul speaks of sin he means not the puppet
sins with which we torment ourselves, but the sin of
Adam in whioh we are begotten and with whioh we are born,
the sin of which we shall not rid ourselves as long as
time shall last,39
Yet in the final upshot of Barth's thinking he agrees with
Kierkegaard's "qualitative leap" in erasing any generic re
lation of sin. The following almost sounds like an argument
from Kierkegaard himself:
The meaning of the famous parallel (so called) between
"Adam and Christ," whioh now follows. Is not that the re
lationship between Adam and us is the expression of our
true and original nature, so that we would have to re
cognize in Adam the fundamental truth of anthropology to
which the subsequent relationship between Christ and us
would have to fit and adapt itself. The relationship
between Adam and us reveals not the primary but only the
secondary anthropological truth and ordering principle.
The primary anthropological truth and ordering principle,
which only mirrors itself in that relationship, is made
clear only through the relationship between Christ and
us . � . .
... It is also true that each of these others has
lived his own life, has sinned his own sins, and has had
to die his own death. Even so, the lives of all other
men after Adam have only been the repetition and varia-
3eKarl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, trans.
Douglas Horton (Massachusetts": The Pilgrim Pres a , 1923),
p. 118.
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tion of hia life, of his beginning and bis end, of his
sin and his death.40
Barth may take a slightly different course of procedure than
Kierkegaard, but the end result is the same�that man can
not help himself in his sin, but must wait for God to move.
Suffering. Kierkegaard discusses at great length
man�s state of suffering and what it does to him as a man,
whereas Barth deals more with the defining of this suffer
ing state that exists due to the vast gulf between God and
man. It is here where Barth will allow that man does have
some sensation of his existence.
... An understanding and consciousness of himself
which man can attain of himself may also embrace the
fact that he does not merely suffer but oreates this In
ward tension, that he continually produces this dia
lectic.41
Again the psychological malady Is implied. But to realize
this is no help. In fact, the helplessness of man is his
despair.
... You may act as if you were God, you may with
ease take his righteousness under your own management.
This is certainly pride.
One might equally well, however, call It despair.
And it is singular that In our relations with God these
two contrasted qualities always keep each other company.
... We are apprehensive of the righteousness of God
because we feel much too small and too human for any-
40Barth, Christ and Adam, pp. 28, 29.
41Barth, The Doctrine of Reconciliation, Part I,
p. 360.
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thing different and now to begin in ua and among ua .
Thia ia our deapair.
And beoause we are ao proud and ao despairing, we
build a tower at Babel. The righteousness of God which
we have looked upon and our hands have handled changes
under our awkward touch into all kinds of human right
eousness .**
In other words , the more we interfere with things , the worse
we make our own situation before God. Thia dilemma keeps
man in a conatant atate of mental and spiritual flux whioh
compels him to cry out after God. This is precisely what
Kierkegaard described with his idea of the "pathos."
� � � However conscious or unconscious of his situa
tion he may be, man cannot escape his humanity, and
humanity means limitation, finitude, creaturehood ,
separation from God. And if he is not eonsolous of it,
if he cannot tell us about it, and if his fellow men
who want to help him cannot understand it, the more
serious his plight.
Man as man cries for God. He cries not for a truth,
but for truth; not for something good but for tEe good;
not for answers but for the answer�the one that is
identical with his own question. Man himself is the
real question, and if the answer Is Fo be found in the
question, he must find an answer In himself; he must be the
answer. He does not cry for solutions but for salva
tion; not for something human, but for God, for God as
his Saviour from humanity.40
The problem of suffering is no trifle for Barth even
though he leaves the more psychological Implications of it
to Kierkegaard and goes on to the more definite doctrinal
42Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man.
pp. 16, 17.
45 Ibid., pp. 189, 190.
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expressions of It. Barth amplifies the understanding of the
extent of suffering In several ways. He speaks of It as a
problem of obedience.
. � � In the secret of the Holy Ghost It is true or
untrue that we at times have or have not faith, and there
fore are obedient and Christian or are not such. For
this reason our sanctif ication is reality, but our obe
dience is a problem that we cannot solve, into the dark
ness of which we can but enter again and again, and be
thrown utterly and alone upon God.44
Again Barth relates temptation to the suffering of man.
. � � "Temptation, " with its anguish, comes when it
is shown how much reason we�even we Christians�have to
repent, and when suffering crashes in upon Christians,
which they alone know, for only they know that God Is
not owing them anything. It comes when the Christian
knows that his being simul peooator et Justus becomes a
Judgment upon him instead of pardon fwhen , to his con
sternation, faith is, at the same time, torn in twain
into man 's act of faith and its source and object to be
qualified for the first time to him as being a genuine
faith; when the experience, whioh includes the joy and
assurance of Christian confidence, remains: (as Luther
said, "Christ withdraws from thee, and leaves thee in the
lurch"). The "temptation" comes when the Christian be
comes aware that of the supreme words of the Faith, even
he only knows and holds actually the words, and his ex
perience, left to itself, is only the experience of his
unbelief, and when the Word of God Himself Is indeed
there but is not there on his behalf :�all these things
are what make "temptation," Temptation is the more or
less visibly increasing finish of human, or religious
powers ,4*>
Barth also refers to death in its suffering aspect.
... 'resurrection'. For this word is the answer to
death's terror, the terror that this life some day comes
to an end, and that this end is the horiaon of our exist-
**Barth, The Holy Ghost and the Christian Life, p. 69.
46 Ibid., pp, 53, 54.
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ence. 'In the midst of life we are girt about with
death. � � . ' Human existence is an existence under
this threat, marked by this end, by this contradiction
continually raised against our existence: you can not
live. You believe in Jesus Christ and can only believe
and not see. You stand before God and would like to en-
Joy yourself and may enjoy yourself, and yet must ex
perience every day how your sin Is new every morning.
There is peace, and yet only the peace which can be con
firmed amid struggle. Here we understand, and yet at
the same time we understand ao overwhelmingly little.
There la life, and yet but life in the shadow of death.
We are beaide each other, and yet must one day separate
from one another. Death sets Its seal upon the whole;
it ia the wages of sin. The account is closed, the
coffin and corruption are the last word. The contest is
decided, and decided against us. Such is death,46
Kierkegaard spoke much about the "dread" aspect of
suffering which leads man inevitably on to God. Though Barth
more pronouncedly ascribes this inevitable leading to God,
he still states a similar case:
We must return to that reserve maintained by the
divine over against the human�though it must now have
become clear to all that the separation of the two can
not be ultimate, for then God would not be God. There
must still be a way from there to here . And with this
"must" and the "still" we confess to the miracle of the
revelation of God. However much the holy may frighten
us back from its unattainable elevation, no less are we
impelled to venture our lives upon it Immediately and
completely. We listen to the voloe which says. Draw not
nigh hither: put off thy shoes from off thy feet, for
the place whereon thou standest is holy ground. And with
Moses, we are afraid to look upon God. But we hear the
voloe continue, "I have surely seen the affliction of my
people which are in Egypt, and have heard their cry, and
am come down to deliver them out of the hand of the
Egyptians"; and we perceive that the first forbiddance
must have been only to complete and olarify the final
message. Isaiah, also, and Jonah finally had to prove
their devotion to the holy by daring to relate it di-
46Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, pp. 15S, 154
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rectly to the secular life of man. The mysterlum tre-
mendum phase, which comes first, finally ceases, and"'
'
with "It that dread of the divine which Is dread and
dread alone. The kernel breaks through its hard shell.
The message Itself, the thought of what God's "coming
down" means for us, the decision to venture with him, is
suffused with a dread whioh conquers mere dread. This
is not the act of man but the act of God in man. And
for thia reason God in consciousness is actually God in
History��and no mere figment of thought. God causes
something to happen, a miracle in our eyes.47
Just as in Kierkegaard's concept so in Barth's,
suffering is not an asceticism or even an endurance of hard
ship; it is rather the pain of a broken spiritual relation
ship to God. Thus the element of suffering is transferred
to the work of Christ says Barth j
... Being a man means being so placed before God as
to have deserved this wrath. In this unity of God and
man the man is bound to be this condemned and smitten
person. The man Jesus in His unity with God is the fig
ure of man smitten by God. Even this world's justice,
whioh carries out this judgment, does so by God's will,
God's Son became man in order to let man be seen under
God 'a wrath. The son of man must suffer and be delivered
up and crucified, saya the Hew Testament. In this
Pasalon the connexion becomes visible between infinite
guilt and the reconciliation that necessarily ensues up
on this guilt. It becomes clear that where God's grace
is rejected, man rushes into hia own mischief. It is
here, where God Himself has become man, that the deepest
truth of human life is manifests the total suffering
whioh corresponds to total sin,48
But we can only understand this suffering as men through
the revealed Christ.
pp. 287, 288.
47Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man,
48Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, p, 106,
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� . � Jesus Christ. He has suffered, He has rendered
visible what the nature of evil is, of man's revolt
against God. . � . He, He has suffered, who is true God
and true man. ... We are simply untouched either by
suffering or by evil in its proper reality; we know that
now. So we can repeatedly escape from the knowledge of
our guilt and sin. We can only achieve proper knowledge,
when we know that He who is true God and true man has
suffered. In other words, it needs faith to see what
suffering Is. Here there was suffering. Everything else
that we know as suffering is unreal suffering compared
with what has happened here. Only from this standpoint,
by sharing in the suffering He suffered, can we recognize
the fact and the cause of suffering everywhere in the
creaturely oosmos, secretly and openly.49
Because suffering is a result of being a man of sin, which
sin is positionally forgiven but never taken away In natural
life, Barth says that suffering has no end and cannot be es
caped in natural existences
When the patient Job pours out his grief, he is think
ing evidently of a grief which, humanly speaking has no
end. ... And when Jesus Christ dies on the cross he
asks not simply, Is It true? but wMy God, my God, why
hast Thou forsaken me?* People have attempted to absolve
Jesus from blame for this utterance by the argument,
difficult to substantiate, that it was not an expression
of real despair�and the fact has been quite overlooked
that it was not less but more than doubt and despairs as
our old dogmatists knew, It was derelict1q, a being lost
and abandoned. To suffer in the Bible means to suffer
because of God; to sin, to sin against God; to doubt, to
doubt of GodTto perish, to perish at the hand of God.
In other words, that painful awareness of the boundary
of mortality which man acquires with more or less cer
tainty in life's rise and fall becomes, In the Bible,
the order of the God of holiness; it is the message of
the cross, and from it, in this life, there is no es
cape .
Ibid., pp. 103, 104.
'Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man
pp. 118, 119.
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Barth's discussion of suffering serves to put a
greater emphasis upon the relationship of Christ to man's
state, whereas Kierkegaard's emphasis is stronger at the
level of analysing the subjective experience of suffering
itself. Otherwise both men are, in general, stating the same
thing. Of course, this one oontrast explains the more posi
tive tone of Barth's writing as against the very dismal
picturing of Kierkegaard's writing.
CHAPTER IV
FAITH AND PARADOX
The area of faith and paradox In the thought of Kier
kegaard and Barth ie one of great oontrast and capable of
great misunderstanding. The background study of the preced
ing ohapters becomes increasingly helpful to the understand
ing of this chapter.
I. FAITH AND PARADOX AS FOUND WITHIN
KIERKEGAARD'S WRITING
Faith. Perhaps one of the most popular topics among
contemporary thinkers is Kierkegaard's view of faith and
paradox. Here the idea of man's basic subjective passion
for the eternal becomes the spring board for this study.
"Faith is a miracle, yet no one is excluded from It, for
passion is common to all men, and faith is a passion."1
Thus faith could be said to be the expression or activity of
this passion.
Faith is not, however, exercised concerning every
thing. For Kierkegaard suggests that if things are easily
understood, you cannot believe them, but if It is difficult
~Sj(ren Kierkegaard , Fear and Trembling, trans .
Walter Lowrie (Princeton t Prinoe'ion University Press, 1945),
p. 86.
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to understand, then It can be believed.2 His favorite illus
tration at this point is Abraham's offering of Isaac as a
sacrifioe upon the altar. Because it was beyond Abraham's
comprehension how God could raise a great nation through
Isaac and still demand that he be slain, it took faith to
act.
However, it cannot be assumed that faith for Kierke
gaard was totally a matter of volition. "A man can become a
tragic hero by his own strength, but he can never, by his
own strength, become a knight of faith,"5 It will be remem
bered that a "tragic hero" is one exalted In men's eyes by
the standards of this sensual world. A "knight of faith" is
concealed from the eyes of man. Of course this renders faith
as rather inexpres sable so far as one man seeing faith in
another man.
The activity of the will does have its part to play
in preparing the way for faith.
. � � faith is not an act of will: for all human
volition has its capacity within the scope of an under
lying condition. Thus If I have the oourage to will the
understanding, I am able to understand the Sooratic
principle, i.e., to understand myself j because from the
Socratio point of view I have the condition, and so have
the power to will this understanding. But If I do not
have the condition ... all my willing is of no avail j
although as soon as the condition is given, the Sooratic
principle will again apply.4
gIbld., pp. 73, 74. 3 lb id., p. 85.
*Soren Kierkegaard, philosophical Fragments, trans.
David F, Swanson (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1936), pp. 50, 51.
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Thia brings in the two basic movements of believing indi
viduals.
. . � According to Kierkegaard the man of faith makes
two movements: first the infinite resignation, then the
movement of faith. The infinite resignation ia the break
with the temporal, it Is a movement which brings peace
and rest, but it does not in itself constitute faith j it
precedes faith. Hence, whoever has not made the infinite
resignation has not arrived at faith. In the infinite
resignation the individual becomes conscious of his eter
nal validity, and only for the person who possesses such
a consciousness can there be a question of grasping
existence by means of faith. The infinite resignation is
regarded as the last stage prior to faith.
In the Infinite resignation the Individual resigns
the" love which Is the content of hia life (of. Abraham's
sacrifice of Isaac) and reconciles himself to the pain.
Then the miracle happens. He makes the further motion;
he saya, I believe that by virtue of the absurd I shall
receive back that which I surrender, for all things are
possible to God, The absurd must not be regarded as a
factor within the compass of the understanding. It is
not identical with the unexpected, the improbable, or
the unsurmised. When the man of faith makes the infinite
resignation, he Is convinced humanly speaking of the im
possibility of any eaoape. The only aalvation la by vir
tue of the absurd which he seizes by means of faith. He
recognizes the impossibility, and at the same time he
believes the absurd. Faith has resignation as its pre
supposition. It ia not an aesthetic emotion, nor an im
mediate instinct of the heart. It Is "the paradox of
life and existence. n� j
Again the illustration of Abraham and Isaac la used to bear
out the meaning of these movements . No one can actually
understand Just what happens within a man at this infinite
movement, yet it is vital to the final movement of faith.
In its broadest sense faith is considered in three
5Reidar Thomte , Kierkegaard ' s Philosophy of Religion
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948), pp . 57, 58.
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basic categories or stages of development whioh lead up to
the dual movements of the actual faith experience itself.
These stages are: the aesthetic existence which is essential
ly enjoyment; the ethical existence whioh is essentially
struggle and victory; the religious existence whioh is essen
tially suffering. These are on� of the keys to unfolding
the complicated entanglement of Kierkegaard's thought. When
one is confused at the point of the exact meaning of what he
is saying, the answer frequently can be found by discerning
whioh one of these three stages he is speaking about.
The aesthetic stage, which is essentially life enjoy*
ment, has a dual characteristic. The first is immediacy.
N. � � The aesthetic in a man is that by which he is imme
diately what he is."6 The second is that it has its condi
tion outside the personality or even within the personality
but in such a manner that it is not the individual's own
contribution, such as the inherent beauty of the individual.
The ethical stage is rather easily understood because
of its proximity to high moral living whioh for Kierkegaard
is more outward form or conformity than inward reality* Her�
morality is not thought to stem from inner purity but Is
merely a pattern of life whioh is sooially accepted rather
65e/ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or. II, trans. David P.
Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson~TPrinc�ton : Princeton
University Press, 1944), p. 150.
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than divinely Initiated,
The strongest emphasis is placed upon the final stage
of the truly religious existence.
. . . The task of the religiously existing individual
Kierkegaard explains in the following words : "The task
is to exercise the absolute telos. striving to reach the
maximum of maintaining simultaneously a relationship to
the absolute telos and to relative ends, not by mediating
them, but by making the relationship to the absolute
telos absolute, and the relationship to the relative
ends relative. The relative belongs to the world, the
absolute relationship to the individual himself."'
This "absolute telos" would be likened unto the concept of
eternal life except that it is found subjectively in the
existential individual. There will always be the paradox of
the relative and the absolute, similar to that of the finite
and the infinite. Yet one must keep on striving to rid him
self of the relative in favor of the absolute. However, this
religion is not to be defined as an Intellectual knowledge
or even as an indoctrination, but rather an existential ap
propriation. This breaks with rational explanation and
leaves religion as experience, which experience Kierkegaard
is confident that most do not have. He says, "If then,
according to our assumption, the greater number of people
In Christendom only imagine themselves to be Christian, In
what categories do they live? They live in aesthetic, or,
at the most, in the aesthetic-ethical categories."8
'Thomte, op_. clt,, p. 88,
8Sjfren Kierkegaard, Point of View, trans. Walter
Lowrie (London: Oxford Un IversiiyTres a , 1939), p, 25,
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Paradox > Already it has been seen how olosely en
twined the idea of paradox is to faith for Kierkegaard, be
cause for Kierkegaard faith is that which goes contradictory
to all reason yet fills the gap of existence which reason can
not fill. Faith is believing that whioh seems impossible by
all human and natural standards. Notice in the following
words of Kierkegaard that this faith must be preceded by
resignation or renunciation, but that faith itself is the
real paradox.
... Faith therefore is not an aesthetic emotion but
something far higher, precisely because it has resigna
tion as its presuppositions it is not an Immediate In
stinct of the heart, but is the paradox of life and
existence. . . .
For the act of resignation faith is not required, for
what I gain by resignation is my eternal consciousness,
and this Is a purely philosophical movement which I dare
say I am able to make if it is required, and which I can
train myself to make, for whenever any finlteness would
get the mastery over me, I starve myself until I can
make the movement, for my eternal consciousness is my
love to God and for me this is higher than everything.
For the act of resignation faith Is not required, but it
is needed when it is the case of acquiring the very
least thing more than my eternal consciousness, for this
lg the paradoxical.
By faith I make renunoiation of nothing, on the con
trary, by faith I acquire everything, precisely in the
sense in which It is said that he who has faith like a
grain of mustard can remove mountains. A purely human
courage is required to renounce the whole of the temp
oral to gain the eternal, but this I gain, and to all
eternity I cannot renounce it, that is a self-contra
diction} but a paradox enters In and a humble courage
is required to grasp the whole of the temporal by vir
tue of the absurd, and this is tne courage of faith.9
Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, pp. 67-70.
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Hence, the distinction is also seen between self-contradic
tion or self-denial and the paradox of faith. This paradox
of faith is often referred to as the "moment" of the leap of
faith* In fact, without the paradox the moment is Impossible.
The moment is the most abbreviated form of the paradox.
Faith and the paradox are so important in Kierkegaard's
thought that it is diffioult to make a thorough discussion
of them without discussing his whole pattern. However, the
paradox of faith must be discussed briefly In relation to
certain terms in Kierkegaard's theology. It has been pre
viously discussed that every man has a basic passion to ar
rive at the eternal consciousness, "? . � the paradox is the
source of the thinker's passion, and the thinker without a
paradox Is like a lover without feeling. * *"10
This paradox of faith is also inclusive of the aspects
of dread and suffering in Kierkegaard. In the following
quotation, where the "universal" refers to the commonly
accepted standard of right and the "knight of faith" refers
to the nonconforming, independent individual, Kierkegaard
pictures the loneliness of the paradoxical faith*
� * � Let us consider a little more closely the dis
tress and dread in the paradox of faith. The tragic hero
renounces himself in order to express the universal, the
knight of faith renounces the universal In order to be
come the universal. He knows that It is beautiful to be
Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, p, 29
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born as the individual who has the universal as his home,
his friendly abiding-place, which at once welcomes him
with open arms when he would tarry in it. But he knows
also that higher than this there windes a solitary path,
narrow and steep; he knows that it Is terrible to be bom
outside the universal, to walk without meeting a single
traveller. He knows very well where he is and how he is
related to men. Humanly speaking, he is crazy. If he is
not supposed to be that, then he is a hypocrite, and the
higher he climbs on this path, the more dreadful a hypo
crite he is.*1
It may be said that conformity to nonconformity is the dread
ful aspect of the paradox. Kierkegaard would not concede
that this is being relative about a standard of righteousness,
but that it is making Christianity rightly individualistic.
It must be noted that the paradoxical is rooted in
the antithesis between Cod and man, i.e., Cod's understanding
of what life ought to be and man's understanding of the same.
Thus as man matures ethically and religiously, he arrives at
the place in his thought where he is able to submit himself
to the divine in a radically transforming relationship* As
the human Is defeated and renounced in this transaction, the
intellect, feeling or will are brought to a concrete con
sciousness of the eternal, This is the paradox of faith whioh
keeps moving toward perfection, never to fully arrive. Hence
the religious life becomes a process of spiritual transforma
tions in the paradox of faith.
HKierkegaard , Fear and Trembling, pp� 115, 116.
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II. FAITH AND PARADOX AS FOUND WITHIN
BARTH'S WRITING
By Interpreting the phraseologies of these two men
one can readily see their unanimity at the points of faith
and paradox.
Faith. As it was with Kierkegaard so with Barth,
faith is a very decisive thing. It literally teems with the
exlatentlal aspect. Yet because it so intimately Involves
man's personality, it is also strongly subjective. Barth
states this in the following i
... Christian faith Is a decision. Thia is where
we have to begin, and wish to begin. Christian faith,
to be sure, Is an event in the mystery between God and
man; the event of the freedom In which God acts toward
this man, and of the freedom which God gives this man.
But this does not exclude, but actually includes the
fact that where there is faith in the sense of the Christ
ian Creed, history is taking place, that there aomething
ia being undertaken, completed and carried out in time
by man. Faith is God's freedom and man's freedom in
action. Where nothing occurred� in time, of course, that
Is, occurred visibly and audibly� there would be no faith
either, , , . God Himself is not suprahlstorioal, but
historical �*2
Faith is the freedom of decision for Barth as it was for
Kierkegaard, who spoke of the "absolute telos,"
Kierkegaard argues vigorously against conformity to
the "universal" standard of Christian dogma. He claims that
12Karl Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, trans. G. T.
Thomson (New York; Philosophlcar~LIbjp�ry, 1949), p. 28.
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one can be a "tragic hero" by human efforts, but that a
"knight of faith" is only made by God. To this Barth would
not only agree, but would also press the matter even further
in the direotion of determinism. Whereas Kierkegaard at
least allowed for certain preparatory "resignation" by man,
Barth would seem even to eliminate this.
Now faith is not the sort of determination of human
action that man can apply to his action at will, or that,
once received, he can maintain at will. It is rather
Itself the gracious approaoh of God to man, the free
personal presence of Jesus Christ In man's action. Thus
we assert that dogmatics presupposes faith, presupposes
the determination of human action through listening, and
as obedience to the essence of the Church; whence we
assert that at �very step and proposition it presupposes
the free grace of God, which may from time to time be
given or else refused, as the object and meaning of this
human action. It depends from time to time upon God and
not upon us, whether our hewing is real hearing, our
obedience real obedience, whether our dogmatics is
blessed and hallowed as knowledge of the proper content
of Christian language, or is idle speculation.!3
This leads to the same passive deterministic attitude to
ward personal evangelism and missions that Kierkegaard so
repeatedly emphasized*
� � .1 believe; so then, it Is itself a recognition of
faith, to reoognize that God is to be known only through
God himself. And if we can repeat this in faith, it
means that I give praise and thanks for the fact that God
the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit is what He is
and does what He does, and has disclosed and revealed
Himself to me, has determined Himself for me and me for
Himself. I give praise and thanks for the fact that I
am elect, that I am called, that my Lord has made me
13Karl Barth, The Doctrine of the Word of God, Part I,
trans. G. T. Thomson (Vol, I of dhurch frogmat'lca. 5 vols.;
Edingurgh? T. and T, Clark, 1936), p, 19.
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free for Himself, In that confidence I believe. That
which I do In believing is the only thing left me, to
which I have been invited, to which I have been made
free by Him who can do what I can neither begin nor
accomplish of myself. I make use of the gift in which
God has given me Himself. I breathe, and now I breathe
Joyfully and freely In the freedom which I have not
taken to myself, which I have not sought nor found by
myself, but in which God has come to me and adopted me.
It is a matter of freedom to hear the w ord of grace in
such a way that man may hold to this word. ... Where
there is faith in the gospel, there the Word has found
confidence, there the Word has so let Itself be heard
that the hearer cannot withdraw from It. There the Word
has^acqulred its meaning as the Word and been establish-
Kierkegaard is also equally emphatic in his contention that
the witness of other men will not assist an individual to
arrive at faith except as the condition for believing is
created by the "Word." This "condition" which Kierkegaard
says prepares man for the "paradox of faith," is similarly
described by Barth.
A new possibility and reality, as it were, open up
to man. Once we are conscious of the life in life, we
continue no longer in the land of the dead, In a life
whose forms unhappily allow us to miss the very meaning
of life�that is, its connection with its creative ori
gin. We perceive the Wholly Other, the eternity of the
divine life) and we cannot escape the thought that for
us also eternal life can alone be called and really be
"life." The Wholly Other, In God� itself resisting all
secularization, all mere being put to use and hyphen
ated�drives us with compelling power to look for as
basic, ultimate, original correlation between our life
and that wholly other life. We would not die but live.
It is the living God who, when he meets us, makes it
inevitable for us to believe in our own life.-8
Berth, Dogmatics in Outline, p, 18.
Berth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, p. 288,
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As Kierkegaard would agree, when we have arrived at "the
moment" or the "paradox of faith," in spite of reason or the
"absurd" whioh contradicts, we will believe* Barth states
it thus:
, , , Christian faith is the gift of the meeting in
which men beoome free to hear tthe word of grace whioh
God has spoken in Jesus Christ in such a way that, in
spite of all that contradicts it, they may once for all,
exclusively and entirely, hold to His promise and
guidance ,16
Kierkegaard also implies that Christians could not be
discerned by the objective manifestations of their lives,
Barth suggests this same state of hidden faith:
* . . But once more, all this not in tranquil secur
ed "givenness" to us, once for all, but in the act of
the divine continual "giving," For thia reason faith,
as Hebrews xi.l hath it, is � . � (the proof of things
unseen), beoause all this indicates an activity the
subject of which ia, and remains, God, and the predi
cate of it is a thought that cannot possibly be trans
ferred to us. If we are justified, we are so simply in
Christ and not in ourselves . That It is really we who
are yet and indeed in that state (sc. of justification),
is and remains undisclosed to us, beoause It becomes
revealed to us in and through the Word of God* Faith
confides, for it confides in God's Word: In this way it
is experience, joy, assurance. But beoause what the
Word says to faith is hidden in this manner faith is
hidden from itself.
. . . The utter unbelievableness, in theory, of the
article of the Faith is only a symptom, in itself un
important , of this practical hiddenness of faith, and
no one else but the Holy Ghost will make faith, in its
'Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, p. 15.
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hiddanness, into aotual faith r certainly our spirit will
not ,17
The subjectivity of faith is so extreme for Barth that even
the apparent judgment of God does not upset the strong unl-
versalistic position that he and Kierkegaard share.
... We look again into the Old Testament and find
continual traces, that these obstinate and lost men�
astoundingly enough!� in certain situations even confirm
their election. When this oocurs, when there Is a kind
of godly, upright continuity, this does not arise from
the nature of Israel, but is rather God's ever renewed
grace. But where there is grace, men are bound contre
coeur to lift up their voice In praise of God, and hear
witness that where God's light falls upon their life, a
reflection of this light in them is bound to respond.
There is a grace of God in the midst of Judgment .1�
Of course Barth would not be true to his Kierkegaard-
Ian ancestry if he did not also decry anything that might
hint at a literal Christian experience which makes demand of
man's own efforts or that calls for any manifested standard
of objective righteousness.
... When we say that faith involves in spite of,
once for all, exclusively and entirely, we are to Hold
to the fact that In faith is involved a 'may', not a
'must'. The moment the thing becomes an ideal instance
we have again dropped out of tne glory of faith. The
glory of faith does not consist in our being challenged
to do something, in having something laid upon us which
is beyond our strength. Palth is rather a freedom, a
permission. It is permitted to be so�that the believer
in God's Word may hold on to this Word in everything, in
spite of all that contradicts it. It is so; we never
I7Barth, The Holy Ghost and the Christian Life,
trans. H . Birch Hoyle (London i Frederick toiler Limited,
1938), pp. 49, 50, 52.
l8Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, p. 80.
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believe 'on account of, never 'because of; we awake
to faith in spite of everything. God is hidden from us
outside His Word. But He is manifest to us in Jesus
Christ. If we look past Him, we must not be surprised
if we fail to find God and experience errors and dis-
illusionments, If the world seems dark to us. When we
believe, we must believe in spite of God's hiddenness .
This hiddenness of God necessarily reminds us of our
human limitation.19
Barth's extreme, even if theological, determinism
drives him to a point at which he not only holds to universal
faith, to a lesser or greater degree In all men, but this
faith puts upon men what he terms as a "character indelible,"
that 1st
... A man who believes once believes once for all.
Don't be afraid; ... Everyone who has to contend with
unbelief should be advised that he ought not to take
his own unbelief too seriously. Only faith Is to be
taken seriously; and if we have faith as a grain of
mustard seed, that suffices for the devil to have lost
his game*20
Even the value of prayer Is considered disparagingly through
Barth's deterministic view of faith:
Prayer may be the acknowledgment that for all our In*
tentions (indeed, our intentions to pray tool) nothing
has been done. Prayer may be the expression of man's de
sire for the will of God. Prayer may mean that man ("for
better or for worse I") gives the verdict for God and
against himself. Prayer u;ay be man's answer to the
divine hearing of prayer already experienced on the way,
the content of the true faith whioh we ourselves have
not actually taken to ourselves. We would not be speak
ing of real prayer, II we were to say "must" instead of
"may." . . � With this indication we are presenting no
AyJbid., pp. 19, 20.
20Ibid., pp. 20, 21.
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one with a means, by the use of which he might contem
plate success for himself in his work* But it has to be
said that we cannot see how this work in particular can
succeed otherwise than on the basis of a divine corre
spondence with this human attitude: "Lord, I believe,
help thou mine unbelief I"21
Again it bears repeating that Barth, under the strong
influence of Kierkegaard's pronounced, deterministic faith,
goes even farther than his predecessor in carrying its im
plications to their logical conclusions in the discussion of
the various doctrines of the Christian faith.
Paradox. Unlike Kierkegaard Barth does not go into a
detailed discussion of the paradox as such. Yet the element
of paradox does very definitely pervade his theology. It Is
from the Kierkegaard!an Idea of paradox that Barth gets such
a strong emphasis upon the transcendence of God. For both
men there Is such a vast expanse between the infinite God
and the finite man that man is totally unable to approach
God or to achieve his own salvation. Barth illustrates this
in discussing man's relation to Adam as compared to man's re
lation to Christ. He emphasizes the point of disparity.
. . � The point here is that when we compare man's
relationship to Adam with his relationship to Christ,
although the two are formally symmetrical, there is
really the greatest and most fundamental disparity
21Barth, The Doctrine of the Word of God, Part I,
p. 25.
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between them. ... 22
Thia disparity exists between the world of sin and grace.
Paradoxically by faith the world of grace overpowera the
world of sin, thus bringing man and God together,
... We can see the disparity between the result of
grace and the result of Sin, and so once more, in a new
way, the disparity between man in Adam and man in Christ.
... The result of sin is to destroy human nature, the
result of grace is to restore it, so that it is obvious
that sin is subordinate to grace, and that it is grace
that has the last word about the true nature of man.23
The paradox is that in spite of the disparity that exists
between God and man, that man is good while he is also bad.
Barth calls this "always sinner yet always righteous." This
is Kierkegaard's idea of the "Absolute" in conflict with the
"relative" which are mediated through the "paradox of faith"
which is Jesus Christ,
* . . Right from the start we have to take account of
the essential disparity between him and Christ, and be
tween our bond with him and our bond with Christ. This
Is not a case of right against right, but of man's wrong
against God's right, not of truth against truth, but of
man's, lie against God's truth. It ia not even a case of
power against power, but of man 'a powerlessneas against
God's power. Least of all is it a case of God against
God�a god of this world against God the Creator�but
simply of man against the one God, and, on the other side,
the same one God for man. That is why we cannot rest
content with the formal parallel and why the question
about the priority and superiority of one side over the
other can only be answered in one. The main point of
22Karl Barth, Christ and Adam, trans. T, A, Small
(New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers , 1952), p. 56,
23 Ibid., pp. 42, 43.
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Rom. 5:12-21 is that here man stands against God in such
a way that, even in his opposition, his wrongness, his
lie, and his powerlessness, he must be a witness for God,
that even as Adam and Adam's ohild he mast be the mirror
that reflects God's work, and so be the precursor of
Christ. Even in his bad relationship to Adam, he still
remains man, and the structure of his nature is such that
it can find its meaning and fulfillment in his good re
lationship to Christ. Even under the lordship of sin and
death his nature Is still human nature and so is the im-
age and likeness of what it will be under the lordship of
grace and life. That Is how the essential disparity be
tween Adam and Christ is contained within their formal
identity. Our relationship to Adam is a subordinate re
lationship, because the guilt and punishment we Incur in
Adam have no independent reality of their own but are
only the dark shadows of the grace and life we find in
Christ .24
The paradox is, for Barth, a "riddle" which covers
the wholfe of man's existence.
Man is a riddle and nothing else, and his universe,
be It ever so vividly seen and felt, is a question. God
stands in contrast to man as the Impossible in contrast
to the possible, as death in contrast to life , as etern
ity in contrast to time." The solution of the riddle, the
answer to the question, the satisfaction of our need is
the absolutely new even whereby the impossible becomes
of itself possible, death becomes life, eternity time,
and Gog man. There is no way which leads to this event j
there Is no faculty in man for apprehending it; for the
way and the faculty are themselves new, being the rev
elation and faith, the knowing and being known enjoyed
by the new man. Jeremiah and the others�may I point
out?�at least made a serious attempt to speak of God.
Whether they succeeded or not is another story. They
made a least the necessary start. At least they under
stood the need in which man finds himself simply by vir
tue of his being man. They understood the question man
asks in his need. And they linked their attempt to
speak of God with that need and that question and with
nothing else. They tore aside every veil from that need
and that question . They were in dead earnest. And this
24 Ibid., pp. 55, 36,
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la the reason we claim descent from that historical line.
We hear the imperative even from history: we otight to
speak of God I It ia an imperative which would give us
perplexity enough even if we were In a position to obey
It ,�O
Hence, the element of uncertainty and perplexity found in
Kierkegaard's writing also manifests itself in Barth.
The tragic distance which severs man from God necess
itates the paradox of faith which Kierkegaard called the
"Absolute paradox." For both Kierkegaard and Barth, this of
necessity goes far beyond man's reason and is personified
in Jesus Christ.
... The word of Christ, according to the consistent
synoptic, Pauline, and Johannine witness, is a type of
obedience to the will of the Father that leads him.
straight toward death. The kingdom of God comes in vio
lently, and after a short application and trial reaches
the last question, the last doubt, the last uncertainty,
the last boundary, where all things cease, and where
there is only one thing to say of the future of the Son
of Man: heaven and earth shall pass awayi At that point
even the question, My God, my God, why hast thou for
saken me? is possible and necessary: at that point there
is nothing more to know, nothing more to believe, nothing
more to do; at that point the only thing to do is to bear
the sin of the world; at that point only one possibility
remains, but that lies beyond all thinking and all
things�the possibility: BeEoId, I make all things newt
The affirmation of God, man, and fhe world given ln"TKe
Sew Testament IsTased exclusively upon the posslbllTfy'
ora new orderlTbaolutely beyontl human thought; andfEerefore, as prerequisiteHEo that crcTer, there must come
a crlSls*"thaT denies all human thought'.2"
This paradox is for both men a type of assurance where man
SSBarth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, p . 197 ,
SSlbld,, p. 80.
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no longer has to ask questions hut takes assurance through
the existence of the paradox of faith.
Must we not also grow beyond the strange question.
Who Is God? As if ve could dream of asking such a ques
tion, have willingly and sincerely allowed ourselves to
be led to the gates of the new world, to the threshold
of the kingdom of God! There one asks no longer* There
one sees. There one hears. There one has. There one
knows. There one no longer gives his petty, narrow lit
tle answers. The question, Who is God? and our inade
quate answers to It come only from our having halted
somewhere on the way to the open gates of the new world;
from our having refused somewhere to let the Bible speak
to us candidly; from our having failed somewhere truly
to desire to-belleve. At the point of halt the truth
again becomes unclear, confused, problematical-narrow,
stupid, highehuroh, non-conformist, monotonous, or
meaningless. 'He that hath seen me hath seen the father.'
That ie it: when w� allow ourselves to press on to the
highest answer, when we find God in the Bible, when we
dare with Paul not to be disobedient to the heavenly
vision, then God stands before us as he really Is,
�Believing, ye shall receive I ' God Is God.2*
A more detailed study of Barth will also yield the
similarity to Kierkegaard regarding the "existential moment"
which ie the paradox of faith. This Is, for Barth, essen
tially "revelation." It is interesting to compare Kierke
gaard's thought with Barth's discussion at this point.
But this * I believe* is consummated In a meeting with
One who is not man, but God, the father, Son, and Holy
Spirit, and by my believing I see myself completely
filled and determined by this object of my faith. And
what interests me is not myself with my faith, but He
In whom I believe. And then I learn that by thinking
^Karl Barth, "The Strange Hew World Within the Bible,"
pier, editor
ss, 1941), P. 1*0.Contemporary
Religious Thought. Thomas S. Kepl
(lew York, Hashvllle: Abingdon-Cokesbury Pre
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of Hia and looking to Him, my interests are also best
provided for, I believe in, credo in, means that I am
not alone. In our glory and in our misery we men are
not alone. God comes to meet us and as our Lord and
Master He oomes to our aid. We live and act and suffer,In good and in bad days, in our perversity and in our
Tightness, in this confrontation with God, I am not
alone, but God meets me; one way or other, I am In all
oiroumatances in company with Him. That is, I believein God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, This
meeting with God Is the meeting with the word of grace
which He has spoken in Jesus Christ, Faith speaks of
God. the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, as Him whomeets us, as the object of faith, and says of this God
that He is one in Himself, has become single in Himself
for us and has become single once more In the eternal
decree, explicated in time, of His free, unowed, uncon
ditional love for man, for all men, in the counsel of His
grace, God is gracious to us�this is what the Confession
of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, says. Thia includes
the fact that of ourselves we cannot achieve, have not
achieved, and shall not achieve togetherness with Him;
that we have not deserved that He should be our God, have
no power of disposal and no rights over Him, but that
with unowed kindness, in the freedom of His majesty, He
resolved of His own self to be man's God, our God, He
tells us that this is so, God* a telling us, 'I am
gracious to you', is the Word of God, the central con
cept of all Christian thinking. The Word of God ia the
word of His grace. And If you ask me where we hear this
Word of God, I oan only point to Himself, who enables us
to hear it, and reply with the mighty centre of the Con-
feaaion, with the second article, that the Word of God's
grace in which He meets us is called Jesus Christ, the
Son of God and Son of man, true God and true Man, Imman-
ual, God with us in this on� .23
Like Kierkegaard, Barth would eliminate any inference
that the paradox of faith could be a defined state of Christ
ian experience. Man is left without sensation or knowledge
to verify his faith, and is in reality oblivious of his own
28Barth, Dogmatics In Outline, pp. 16, 17,
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faith, one never arrives at any level of experienced real
ity in Christ. He must always find himself in the surging
flux of the paradox.
� � � This hiddenness of faith becomes concrete again
in the fact that, to faith, repentance, yea, deepest
repentance for grave sins, can never for a moment be
left behind, as if done with . , , it is the aotion of
the Word of God, the action of Christ, who is always the
One who makes him out to be a sinner, in order to make
him, though a sinner, into a righteous man. But the
two things, the knowledge of this contradiction and the
knowledge of its being surmounted, are not our own
business, but are the Holy Ghost's.29
Barth further makes a defining statement of the paradox
whioh confirms the idea of personal passivity In regard to
one's faith in Christ, Here he is even more extreme than
Kierkegaard,
* . . They venture the paradox (the necessary para
dox) that for the understanding of this righteousness
being imparted to the person receiving it, the person
must be left out of consideration. . . � Put briefly:
their understanding of what alone constitutes Christian
life in the Holy Ghost was their affirmation, that man
becomes justified for Christ 's sake only through faith.30
In other words, understanding the fact of redemption through
Christ is the best that man can ever hope to do. Beyond
this factual understanding, Barth sees the paradox as being
similar to the KierkegaardIan "leap" of faith.
29Barth, The Holy Ghost .and the Christian Life,
pp, 52, 53.
50Ibld., pp, 40, 41, 42.
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Such a paradoxical structure Is possible to the
theologies of Kierkegaard and Barth because of the absolute
transoendenoe of God which Kierkegaard posited. Barth again
restates the sovereignty of God,
... Ih sovereign anticipation of our faith God has
justified us through the sacrificial blood of Christ.
In the death of His Son God has Intervened on our behalf
in the "nevertheless'' of His free grace in face of the
apparently insurmountable power of our revolt and re
sistance. ... So He has made peace, so reconciled us,
so commenced His love toward us. Because God in Jesus
Christ so exercised His sovereignty on our behalf, be
cause this is the love of God poured forth through the
Holy Spirit in our hearts, we have for our future only
the bold word sCthBsometha "we shall be saved" . � �
and there is nothing left to us but to glory in our
existence .51
The idea of paradox Is again treated, from another
vantage-point, in a subsequent chapter dealing with history
and God as sovereign of all history.
3*Barth, Christ and Adam, p. 22.
CHAPTER V
ETHICS AND TRUTH
This is without a doubt the most practical area of
Kierkegaard * s theology. However, it has also served as the
most obvious proof against his thought for many of Kierke
gaard's objectors. It is in the area of ethics and truth
that his existential theology comes closest to being subject
ed to the pragmatic test of human life.
I. ETHICS AND TRUTH AS POUND WITHIN
KIERKEGAARD 'S WRITING
Ethics . Though he says much concerning the ethical,
yet nowhere does Kierkegaard present what might be termed a
systematic ethics. There seems to be a lack of identity
between a man's intellectual views and an ethical life.
This doubtless has its basis in the fact that Kierkegaard
takes a psychological interpretation of the Holy Bible.
This leads him to a theory which he calls the "teleologioal
suspension of the ethical," which means that the truly re
ligious Individual finds occasion to go beyond the commonly
accepted standard of ethics in adopting a temporary standard
for some given circumstance. Here again Kierkegaard oites
the case of Abraham sacrificing Isaac as a proof to the
theory. Ordinarily killing one's son would be unethical.
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With Abraham the situation was different. By his act he
overstepped the ethical entirely and possessed a higher telos
outside of it, in relation to whioh he suspended the former.1
This is not to abrogate the ethical but simply to suspend it.
Because man's relationship to God is suob a private thing,
this can be done.
For Kierkegaard the ethical is the universal. But
the religious will rise above the ethioal and the universal,
for the ethioal is only the second in three asoending stages
of spiritual progress. It must be emphasized again that the
particular and the individual are above the ethioal and the
universal. One determines then his relation to the univer
sal ethioal maxims by his relationship to God. Thus, due to
this absolute relation to God, the individual can not make
himself intelligible to others. This leaves the knight of
faith very much alone and in pain. Yet sympathy Is useless
because this state of being religious is so individualistic
that no man can help another; yet he contends that all men
have equal access to it. This makes witnessing simply
setting an example, not teaching. Even this example is not
of one's objective life but rather one's subjective life.
This also excludes the necessity of sectarianism, for this
^S^ren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Walter
Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945), p. 88.
88
only serves to oonoeel man at the point of the universal and
ethical causing him to sin by not exposing himself In an
absolute duty toward God. "The absolute duty may cause one
to do what ethics would forbid, but by no means can it cause
the knight of faith to oease to love. This is shown by
Abraham, 1,2
In summary, here are the words of Kierkegaard:
. . . The paradox of faith Is this, that the indi
vidual is higher than the universal, that the individ
ual ... determines his relation to the universal by
his relation to the absolute* The paradox can also be
expressed by saying that there is an absolute duty
toward God; for in the relationship of duty the indi
vidual as an individual stands related absolutely to
the absolute. So when in this connection it is said
that it is a duty to love God, something different is
said from that in the foregoing; for If this duty is
absolute, the ethical is reduced to a position of rel
ativity. Prom this, however, it does not follow that
the ethical is to be abolished, but it acquires an
entirely different expression, the paradoxical expression
to that which, ethically speaking, is required by duty.3
Truth, In the area of truth it will likewise be seen
that Kierkegaard again moves to a very relatlvistlc position.
Truth cannot legislate a world-standard In a code of doc
trines but depends upon the Individual's absolute relation
to a transoendent God. Thus he settles truth for himself
individually regardless of others. So man only needs a
teacher to make him conscious of what he already knows as
2 Ibid., pp. Ill, 112. 3 Ibid., p. 105
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Truth within himself. Kierkegaard expresses It thus :
� � . Nor can it interest me otherwise than histori
cally that Socrates' or Prodious' doctrine was this or
that; for the Truth In which I rest was within me, and
oame to light through myself, and not even Socrates
could have given it to me, as little as the driver can
pull the load for the horses, though he may help them by
applying the lash . . . for the underlying principle of
all questioning Is that the one who Is asked must have
the Truth in himself, and be able to acquire It by
himself.4
It must not be mistaken that this inward potential
for truth Is Immanent in man. Truth is not contained within
a man Immanently or beoause he is human but rather because
of his individual contact with God. Kierkegaard makes a
sharp distinction between Religion A and Religion B, as he
calls It. Religion A Is the religiosity of immanence or
human religiosity resting upon the supposition that truth is
immanent in the human subjectivity. In Religion A, moral
and religious life are brought to normalcy by a concentra
tion of the personality upon the inner self. The reason for
this is because God Is held to be immanent in all men. This,
of course, refers to Hegelian humanism. However, in Religion
B or Christianity, the individual knows that human subjec
tivity is untruth without the absurd leap of faith which
brings about the absolute contact with the transcendent God.
4Se/ren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans
David F. Swan aon (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1936), p. 8.
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. . . Error is then not only outside the truth, but
polemic in its attitude toward it; which is expressed by
saying that the learner has himself forfeited the condi
tion and is engaged In forfeiting it.
The Teacher is then God himself, who in aotion as an
occasion arises prompts the learner to recall that he is
in Error, and that by reason of his own guilt, what shall
we oall it? Let us call it Sin.5
When life has been broken by sin and an immediate re
lationship to God is destroyed, It is necessary for "repeti
tion, " as Kierkegaard calls it, to restore this. Repetition
is an act of faith or a religious movement by virtue of the
absurd. Kierkegaard defines it as follows:
... repetition is the interest of metaphysics, and
at the same time the interest upon which metaphysics
founders. Repetition is the solution contained in every
ethical view, repetition Is the conditio sine quo non
of every dogmatic problem.6
Repetition could be classed as the 'new birth' for Kierkegaard
where man by mental deliberation in his existential subjec
tivity is able to arrive at the condition where he may take
the leap of faith. "Repetition" for Kierkegaard becomes
about the same as "recollection" was for the Greeks, who
taught that all knowledge is reoollectlon. Modern philos
ophy teaches that all of life is but repetition. "Repeti
tion and reoollectlon are the same movement only in opposite
5 lb id. p. 10.
ft ,
Seren Kierkegaard, Repetitions, trans. Walter
Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 34.
91
directions; for what is recollected has been, Is repeated
backwards, whereas repetition properly so called is recollec
ted forwards."7 This thought process of repetition which
brings one to the condition where faith leaps to the absurd
Initiated by some "occasion." This occasion could be liken
ed to the orthodox term of "witness" but is not a definitive
witness that explains. Rather It is a vague Indefinite
provoking which simply starts the individual spiritual move
ment that climaxes in the truly religious state of Christian
faith. The following quotation Is both significant and
typical of Kierkegaard's Idea of the way in whioh one be
comes a witness to the truth without explaining anything,
but rather provoking the listener to start on his own venture
in faith.
... If we wish to express the relation subsisting
between a contemporary and hia suoceasor In the briefest
possible oompass, but without aacrlfIcing accuracy to
brevity, we may say : The successor believes by means of
(this expresses the occasional) the testimony of the
contemporary, and in virtue of the condition he himself
receives from God.�The testimony of the contemporary
provides an ocoasion for the successor, juat as the
immediate contemporaneity provides an occaalon for the
contemporary. And If the teatimony is what it ought to
be, namely the teatimony of a believer, It will give
occasion for precisely the same ambiguity of the aroused
attention aa the wltnea8 himaelf has experienced, occa-
aioned by the immediate contemporaneity. If the testi
mony ia not of this nature, then it Is either by a
'Reidar Thomte, Kierkegaard ' a Philosophy of Religion
(Princetons Princeton University Press, 1948), p. 71.
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historian, and does not deal essentially with the object
of faith, as when a contemporary historian who was not a
believer recounts one or another factj or It is by a
philosopher, and does not deal with the"objeot of faith.
The Believer on the other hand communicates his testi
mony In such form as to forbid immediate acceptance} for
the words: I believe�in spite of the Reason and my own
powers of invention, present a very serious counter-
consideration.
There is no disciple at second hand. The first and
the last are essentially on the same plane, only that a
later generation finds Its occasion in the testimony of
a contemporary generation, while the contemporary gener
ation finds this occasion in its own immediate contem
poraneity, and in so far owes nothing to any other gen
eration. But this immediate contemporaneity is merely an
occasion, which can scarcely be expressed more emphati
cally than in the proposition that the disciple, if he
understood himself, must wish that the immediate contem
poraneity should cease, by God's leaving the earth.8
II. ETHICS AND TRUTH AS POUND WITHIN
BARTH'S WRITING
Ethics. Kierkegaard and Barth are so much alike at
the point of ethics that if there is any difference at all
It would be that Barth is more deterministic in regard to
human conduct. Of course, it Is obvious that Barth grounds
every ooncept of his in his peculiar view of the Bible,
Once more we stand before this "other" new world
which begins in the Bible, In it the chief considera
tion is not the doings of man but the doings of God�not
the various ways which we may take if we are men of good
will, but the power out of which good will must first be
created�not the unfolding and fruition of love as we
may understand it, but the existence and outpouring of
Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, pp. 87, 88,
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eternal love, of love as God understands It�not indus
try, honesty, and helpfulness as we may practice them in
our old ordinary world, but the establishment and growth
of a new world, the world In whioh God and His morality
reign. . � � In this world the true hero is the lost son,
who Is absolutely lost and feeding swine�and not his
moral elder brother. The reality which lies behind
Abraham and Moses, behind Christ and his apostles, Is
the world of the Father, in whioh morality Is dispensed
with beoause it is taken for granted,9
This is what Kierkegaard would term as the "teleologies!
suspension of the ethioal," Barth like Kierkegaard points
to various incidents in Scripture which for him seem to
Imply a "remarkable indifference to our conception of good
and evil."10
Because Barth is also in reaction against humanistic
theology, he does his best to undercut any social idea of
Christian ethics. Here again the absolute transcendence of
God Is pressed to a point of determinism. "What can the
Christian In society do but follow attentively what is done
by God?"11 This serves to relieve ethical responsibility to
others, thus bringing out the extreme Individualism which Is
so apparent within Kierkegaard's writing, Barth's discussion
of the conscience and the individual brings out this effect
yKarl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man,
trans. Douglas HortoiTTMassachusetTs : TheTilgrim~Press ,
1928), pp. 39, 40.
10lbid , . pp, 38, 39. Hlbld., pp. 326-27.
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of Kierkegaard. Here Barth pushes the deterministic aspect
to its utter extreme.
In the Holy Ghost we have a conscience. It is some
thing surprising that theological ethics, which has had
so much worry with this word conscience, has never
arrived at the simple thought of interpreting It by es-
ohatology. Syn-eidBais. con-soientia (the Greek and
Latin terms) a "co-knowledge" along with God about what
is good and evil: who should have this, unless it be the
child of God who is continually being regenerated
through the word? This child knows, in his action, about
his Father's will. This child may, and can , and must
say to himself what the Father says, even to this child
is referred the great Sohlelermacherian monstrosity�
the "God-consoiousness." God-consciousness within the
self-consciousness of man Is no longer a horror but
utter truth. This child looks beyond the present, also
beyond the dialectical paradox of "always sinner and
always righteous," to the coming kingdom of His father.
This ohild will always be in the posture of one expect
ing and hastening. If he is understood, he lives the
one, the right life whether In taking in breath or
"expiring." He may be such a one, of course, that has
even maxims, at least to outward view�("to the pure all
things are pure")�he may be a realist or an Idealist;
these principles of his may be conservative or revolu
tionary: he may be a pietist perhaps, but quite as well
a Communist; he may; for then he certainly must . Enthu
siastic fanaticism is not forbidden him. Nowhere does
It stand written that God has a preference for home-
baked bourgeois talents. But if he is a fanatic (like
the Anabaptist), then he is such as all the Prophets
were: men who raved. This child of God will speak out
and be a missionary whether he will or no, and will not
allow himself to be muzzled by any tactics of Church or
State manoeuvring and manipulation, in the midst of
which he lives. Nor will he be gagged by any hole-and-
corner legislation that comes from human movements and
institutions. Yea: he will gladly, and in the last re
sort, be in the minority, as a matter of fact. Finally,
he will be utterly alone. Because this child of God
speaks, he does not ask what his hearers like, not
what the result will be, not as to the consequences.
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He speaks beoause he must speak.12
In the face of such utter determinism, what objective can a
man possibly have? What does he strive for? Barth answers;
The real Christian life consists therefore in the
accomplishment of daily thankfulness and repentance
which, when it is efficacious and genuine, is not the
good or bad fruit of our efforts, but is as a reitera
tion of faith in Jesus Christ the work of the Holy
Spirit.1*
Barth agrees with Kierkegaard in the making of an ethical
decision.
The problem of the good calls In question all actual
and possible forms of human conduct, all temporal
happenings in the history both of the Individual and of
society. What ought we to do? is our question; and this
what, infiltrating and entrenching itself everywhere,
directs its attack against all that we did yesterday and
shall do tomorrow. It weighs all things in the balance,
constantly dividing our manifold activities into good
and bad� in order the next moment to do the same thing
over again, as If for the first time since the world
began. It continually breaks out in crisis, causing us
to re-examine what but now we thought to be bad.
When we speak of the problem of ethics today, we
mean as far as possible to eliminate any time element
which might separate us from and cause us to be spec
tators of the problem In its reality.14
12Karl Barth, The Holy Ghost and the Christian Life,
trans . R, Birch Hoyle (London t Frederick Muller Limited",'"""
1938), pp. 81, 82.
13Karl Barth, The Knowledge of God and the Service of
God, trans. J. L. M. HaTre and Ian Trenderaon (London}
SToughton Publishers, 1938), p. xxl .
14Barth, The Wora of God and the Word of Man, pp. 138,
139, 142.
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Thus, Barth is extremely loyal to the KierkegaardIan habit
of viewing ethics in a totally existential perspective.
However, it cannot be assumed that Barth allows even
enough of the concrete concept to come in so that one might
have any consciousness of doing what is right.
* . . this our obedience, is just as completely
hidden as our faith is in its aspect of repentance and
trust. It is hidden beoause this obedience of ours,
never, not even partially, becomes preceptlble to us
unequivocally in itself, and because also, "that" and
"how" grace is actual on our behalf is hidden In the
darkneaa of faith, in whioh only the Word itself ia the
light.15
Barth ia utterly oppoaed to any syatem of ethics aa such,
just as Kierkegaard la*
. * . Both these thingaj the presumed sure knowledge
about the divine compulsions of our own exiatence, and
the confident taking up of the Bible, as if it gave a
liat of moral counsels, are both in principle identi
cally arbitrary . . .
The upshot of all thia is, that theological ethics
should not in any way try to say directly what God's
command is. It should not make appeal to the truths
supposed to lie In nature as creation of God, not
appeal to thia, that or the other text in the Bible. . * .
The particular thing incumbent upon such ethics is to
take the Word of God as being God's Word, and to point
out the way whereby the relative necessities of our
existence as creatures oan become the Word of God's
revelation to us. This duty must be discharged by
ethics in the light of what Scripture proclaims. But
it is not called upon to determine to what extent they
are Hia, for this is solely the business of God's Word.I6
15Barth, The Holy Ghost and the Christian Life,
pp. 62, 63.
16Ibid.. pp. 23, 24.
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Barth denies any possibility of human goodness or purity of
moral nature whioh seems to even include the perfection of
the human-Christ .
� � . We know that no personality whose will is
governed by the idea of humanity and is therefore a pure
and autonomous and good will�we know that no such moral
personality has ever stepped into our world over the
threshold of the world of freedom. STo such man has ever
lived or will ever live. It is impossible to dream or
to think of a man without Interest, or of a man with an
Interest In the moral law as such. There is no such
thing in time or space as a human will determined by
pure practical reason.*7
For both Kierkegaard and Barth, ethics is an extreme
ly relative subject which rests totally upon the existential
freedom of the individual, which freedom is determined by
God, Hence, Barth can afford to assume a very careless atti
tude with respect to human oonduot which leaves the ultimate
problem totally in God's hands.
The fact remains that man as man is irresistibly
compelled to acknowledge that his life is the business
for whioh he is responsible, that his desires require
examination, and that the might-be is sometimes the
ought-to-be which is the truth about truth, the ultimate
governor of conduot .I8
Truth, The definition of truth is a very determinative
part of Barth's theology just as it la of Kierkegaard's the
ology. The basic method of determining truth is the same in
1 'Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, p. 184.
18lbld�. p. 138.
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Barth as his forerunner. For both there is the basic suppo
sition of the existential thinking of man. Barth argues
this in the following quotation:
By the knowledge of an object by men we understand
the proof of their acquaintance with its reality in re
spect of Its being thus and thus (or its nature). But
"proof of their acquaintance" implies that the reality
of the object in question, its existence and its nature,
now becomes, while true in Itself, somehow and with some
degree of clarity and definition also true for them.
Their acquaintance with it from being an accidental be
comes a necessary, from being an external becomes an
Inward determination of their own existence. As knowers
they are got at by the known object. They exist no long
er without it, but with it. So far as they think of It
at all they must think of it, with the entire trust with
whioh they venture to think of it at all, aa true reali
ty, as true In its exiatence and nature, whatever else
and however else they may think of It, they must begin
by thinking of the actual truenesa of its reality. When
faoed with thia trueneaa they can no longer withdraw
into themselves in order from there to affirm, question,
or deny it. Its trueness has come home directly to them
personally, has become property. And at the aame time
they themselves have become the property of Its trueness.
TMs event, thia verification of proof we call, to dis
tinguish it from mere knowing, knowledge. A knowing be
comes knowledge when the man becomes a responsible wit
ness to its content.19
This, of course, all leads into Barth's theory of the Bible,
Barth applies this same existential argument to the validity
of the Scriptures. Hence, It is from this that he gets Ms
view of the Bible, and the Bible becomes the basis of all
Truth. For him the Bible does not so much give us a know-
i9Karl Barth, The Doctrine of the Word of God, Part I,
trans. G. T. Thomson (Vol. I of Church Dogmatics, 5 vols.;
Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1936), p. 2l4T~
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ledge about God as It does a knowledge of God. "It ia our
part to confirm it In our own lives by laboring to relate
ourselves, our daily task, and our hour of history to God
the Creator and Redeemer."80 Barth1 a exlatentlal application
to Scripture enables him to reverse entirely the traditional
Interpretation so that his approach sounds like this:
It ia not the right human thoughts about God which
form the content of the Bible, but the right divine
thoughta about men. The Bible tella us not how we
ahould talk with God but what he aays to us; not how we
find the way to him, but how he haa Bought and found
the way to ua; not the right relation in which we muat
place ourselves to him, but the covenant which he haa
made with all who are Abraham's apiritual children and
which he has sealed once and for all In Jesus Christ.
It la this which ia within the Bible. The word of God
la within the Bible.
But we are not yet quite at an end. We have found in
the Bible a new world, God, God' a aovereignty, God's
glory, God's incomprehenaible love. Not the history of
man but the history of God, Not the vlrtuea of men but
the vlrtuea of him who hath called ua out of darkness
Into his marvelous light I Not human standpoints but the
atandpoint of God.2*
Truth, for Barth, is not found within the details of the
Scriptures. The facts of which the Bible speaka are all
relatively unimportant as compared to the "spirit" behind
the facts. The authority of the scriptures is not based upon
20Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, p, 51.
21Karl Barth, "The Strange New World Within the Bible,"
Contemporary Religious Thought, Thomas S. Kepler, editor
TSew York,' Nashville : Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1941), p. 138,
139.
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any objective evidences but purely upon the subjective indi
vidual manifestation. It is the expectation of men to be
caught hold of by this "spirit" and thus to receive divine
revelation through the agency of the Holy Spirit. For this
reason Barth remarks of St. Paul's writing: "I seem to see
within so transparent a piece of literature a personality
who is aotually thrown out of his course and out of every
ordinary course by seeing and hearing what I for my part do
not see and hear�."22 With this view of truth as being
contained within Scripture, no oonorete demands can inhibit
the existential freedom of a "believer."
It is the peculiarity of Biblical thought and speech
that they flow from a source which is above religious
antinomies. The Bible treats, for Instance, of both
creation and redemption, grace and Judgment, nature and
spirit, earth and heaven, promise and fulfillment. To
be sure, it enters now upon thia and now upon that side
to its antitheses, but it never brings them pedantically
to an end; It never carries on Into consequences; It
never hardens, either in the thesis or in the antithesis;
it never stiffena into positive or negative finalities.
. � � What the Pible is interested In never loaea Its
Importance but is never captured in a word. It desires
not to be accepted but understood, itveuuo;TiHoi.Q rcvevuaTiKo:,
spirit by spirit. It ia through and through dialectic
� , . Biblical dogmatics are fundamentally the suspen
sion of all dogmatics . The Bible has only one theolog
ical interest and that ia not apeculatives Interest in
God himself.23
Barth maintains that truth, or revelation, cornea
22Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, p. 63.
23 Ibid., pp. 72, 73.
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through man's conscience. All that is within man reaohea
out for the certainty whioh the conscience gives. Man must
let the conscience speak and tell him of the righteousness
of Ood. It is in the conscience that man Is oonvlnced that
he has a goal in living for "it speaks of an existence high
er than Joy and deeper than pain.1*24 But the conscience Is
not something we can control or help. It is simply the area
where man Is by faith made aware of truth in a deterministic
way.
Faith is therefore invariably the recognition of our
limits and the recognition of the mystery of the Word
of God, the recognition that our hearing is bound to God
Himself who wills to lead us now through form to content,
and now through content back to form, and in both cases
to Himself, who one way or the other does not give Him
self into our hands, but keeps us in His hand.25
Thus it can be seen that Barth dwells upon the absolute
activity of God upon the subjective aspect of man, which
brings man, regardless of his will, into the truth. This is
quite in harmony with Kierkegaard's position though it is
expressed in a different way. Barth does not outline the
three Kierkegaardian steps of j aesthetic stage, ethical
stage, and religious stage. However, both men argue the
same subjective, deterministic medium of arriving at truth.
IMd., p. 11.
25Barth, The Doctrine of the Word of God, Part I,
p. 201.
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With Kierkegaard, Barth also believes that a propaga
tion of truth by man is not feasible beoause truth only comes
to each man individually through the subjective aotivity of
the Holy Spirit�revelation . Man can never be a teacher of
divine truth; only God ia a Teacher. Yet there is a sense
in which man may make a passive witness;
... We cannot apeak of God. For to speak of God
seriously would mean to speak in the realm of revelation
and faith. To speak of God would be to speak God's
word, the word which can come only from him, the wordthat God becomea man. We may say these three words, butthia la not to apeak the word of God, the truth for
whioh these words are an expression. Our ministerial
task is to say that God becomes man , but to say it as
00(1 himself say a It. Thia would he the answer to man's
queat ion about redemption from humanity.8�
This is the only message a preacher and personal witness can
give. Aside from this every other message of so called
truth ia purely relevant. Church dogmatics beeomea a kind
of watchman to preserve the one eaaenoe of truth. As Barth
says: "... dogmatics, which means a critical examination
of modern, relatively free formulations of concepts and new
ways of thinking relative to the Interpretation of the text
in the proclamation of the Church."27 This gives Barth the
following view of church creeds:
26Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man,
pp, 198, 199,
�� � �� � �� ���
27Karl Barth, God In Action, trans. E. G. Homrig-
hausen and Karl J. Ernsf flew York: Round Table Press Inc,
1936), p. 53.
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� � . The doctrines , laws, and commandments which we
now affirm as existing separately and each in its own
right� . . � all were once a unity; and their unity was
not that of a fundamental idea which bracketed them as a
system of thought but was rather that of original truth,
which is of an order above that of ideas. The reformed
creeds differ from the Augsburg Confession and others by
the fact that in committing themselves, at a measured
distance, to the one object of all thought, they follow
a course which, though less dramatic and effective for
theology, at least saves them from staking everything
upon the oard of any doctrine , They refer all doctrines
away from itself To the one Object. To them truth Is
God�not their thought about God but God himself and God
alone, as he speaks his own word in Scripture and in
Spirit ,**8
Thus Barth would contend that even dogmatics can do no more
than to keep contending after the better. Each succeeding
epoch, if the men have been faithful to the Word, will hope
for Improvement over the latter.29 It Is from this basis
that Barth defines the function of a human witness:
. * . Testimony is a word of man which has been given
of God, the oapacity of reminding other men of God's
reign, grace, and judgment. Where a human word (speech)
has this capacity, there is Church.30
Barth has taken the thinking of Kierkegaard and
applied it at the level of the Church. Where Kierkegaard
wrote at a distance and failed to define the practical im
plications of his thinking, Barth has sought to translate
Kierkegaard's whole system of truth, end to apply it to the
^�Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, pp. 234,
235 .
29Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, pp. 11, 12.
30Barth, God in Aotion. p. 94.
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Bible and even to the creeds and dogmas of the church,
Where Kierkegaard stood as segmented from all descendant
lines of theological thinking, Barth has brought Kierkegaard's
thinking of truth into a woven pattern that runs baek through
John Calvin and St, Paul,
CHAPTER VI
HISTORY AND SALVATION
History and salvation are by no means the least im
portant of the Kierkegaard ian themes, yet they come most
naturally as a conclusive picture after the other main em
phases of his theology have been explored. In this area
many traditional orthodox terms are employed with an exis
tential twist.
I, HISTORY AND SALVATION AS POUND WITHIN
KIERKEGAARD'S WRITING
History. In the study of history it is necessary to
take a more definitive approach of Kierkegaard's view of
God, for history and God are closely commingled In his the
ology. In the following statements it can be seen that
Kierkegaard's oonoept of God is rather broad and indefinite.
God seems to be an indefinite something, away from whioh
man can never thoroughly break, and yet whom he can never
completely prove.
... But what is this unknown something with which
the Reason collides when inspired by its paradoxical
passion with the result of unsettling even man's know
ledge of himself? It Is the Unknown. It is not a
human being in so far as we know what man is ; nor is it
any other known thing. So let us call this unknown
something j God. It Is nothing more than a nam� we
assign to It. The idea of demonstrating that this un
known something (God) exists, could scarcely suggest
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itself to the reason.
. . . But between God and his works there exists an
absolute relationship { God is not a name but a concept.
... In beginning my proof I presuppose the Ideal in
terpretation, and also that I will be successful in
carrying it through, but what else is this but to pre
suppose that God exists so that I really begin by virtue
of confidence in him?l
This ideal of God seems to be expressed in man in terms of
an unknown longing, with which he will not be at ease except
while in pursuit of the eternal rest,
Kierkegaard does have a highly transcendent view of
God , There is a paradox between God and man , Man by t he
help of God finds out that he Is totally unlike God. Yet
insofar as man receives this knowledge from God�Just this
much he is like God. Man's unlikeness to God is only ex
plained by what man derives from himself. This unlikeness
Is sin. Yet man cannot find this out for himself. Thus the
paradox demands the divine intervention.
. . . The consciousness of sin, which he indeed could
no more teach to another than another could teach It to
him, but only God�if God consents to become a Teacher.
But this was his purpose, as we have Imagined it. In
order to be man's Teacher, God proposed to make himself
like the Individual man, so that he might understand him
fully. Thus our paradox is rendered still more appalling,
or the same paradox has the double aspect whioh proclaims
It as Absolute Paradox negatively by revealing the abso
lute likeness of sin, positively by proposing to do away
Is/ren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans.
David F. Swanson (Prinoeton: Princeton University Press,
1936), pp. 31, 33.
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with the absolute unlikeness in absolute likeness.2
Here can be seen Kierkegaard's faint view of the Saviour who
mediates this absolute unlikeness of man to God, Here is
God breaking in upon the individual history of every man to
bring him to the truth. It Is God bringing every man to this
knowledge of truth or "condition*1 where his faith may experi
ence the "moment'' and lift man to the level of the truly re
ligious. This is near to the orthodox concept of the God-
man.
. . � But faith must steadily hold fast to the Teacher.
In order that we may have the power to give the condition
the Teacher must be God: in order that he may be able to
put the learner in possession of it he must be Man.
Thia contradiction is again the object of faith, and is
Paradox, the Moment.3
It may be said that God inatitutea a divine work of
redemption for every man individually, as man is brought to
the place where he is able to believe the absurd. This view
of God and the saving aapect of God must be seen aa a vital
part of Kierkegaard ' a idea of history. Hence, God does not
act in secular history as the great oulmlnator of all things.
Rather he ia the Abaolute, at which all men must arrive in
apite of, and divorced from, this temporal world.
Again let it be noted how Kierkegaard clinga to the
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"moment " as the all Important content of history.
... And now the moment, such a moment has a peculiar
character. It is brief and temporal indeed, like every
moment, it is transient as all moments are; it is past,
like every moment in the next moment. And yet it is de
cisive, and filled with the eternal. Such a moment
ought to have a distinctive name; let us call it the
Fullness of TimeA
Temporal history is relatively unimportant and of
little profit for Kierkegaard. The individual history of
existence as related to the absolute divine plan of history
seems to take all precedence. The whole plan of man's re
demption from sin fits into this individual historical view.
The Garden of Eden and the fall and other Biblical concepts
of spiritual history all become so very personal and indi
vidualistic that they are merely pictures of what every man
goes through subjectively and are never to be taken as lit
eral or put on a level with the history of the generations.
One more quotation will summarize the whole picture
of the "Teacher" and the "learner" In the historical set up.
This parallel use of orthodox terms helps one to fit the
whole picture together,
... What now shall we call such a Teacher, one who
restores the lost condition and gives the leaner the
Truth? Let us call him Saviour, for he saves the
learner from his bondage and from himself, let us call
him Redeemer, for he redeems the learner from the cap-
tlvity into which he had plunged himself, and no cap
tivity is so terrible and so impossible to break, as
Ibid., p. 13,
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that which the individual keeps himself. And still we
have not said all that is necessary; for by his self im
posed bondage the learner has brought upon himself a
burden of guilt, and when the Teacher gives him the con
dition and the Truth he constitutes himself an Atonement,
taking away the wrath impending upon that of which the
learner has mad� himself guilty.5
Salvation � The subject of salvation has been mentioned
many times throughout this discourse. It must be brought out
in its most specific form here at the conclusion of the dis
cussion of Kierkegaard, in order to bring the greatest
possible clarity.
It must first be noted that the whole problem of be
coming a Christian Is subjective, it has nothing whatever
to do with the systematic arrangement of the truths of Christ.
Religion is essentially other-worldly and is related to "an
eternal blessedness ." His is a salvation from llfe�s de
spair rather than the condemnation of sin. For him one can
not simply will to be saved at this certain hour, but he
must proceed in the journey of spiritual enlightenment by
the three "stages."6 When he comes to that "moment" of sub
jective existence where he sees the Truth and takes the leap
of faith, he is then becoming a saved or redeemed man. He
is saved from his guilt which makes him a sinner. This is
not a salvation from the acts of sin or from the motives of
5 lb Id., p. 12. 6cf# pp, 69> 70,
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sin but from the guilt whioh he engenders from being objec
tive instead of subjective. Yet he is always "becoming" and
never arriving at true Christianity.
Kierkegaard ia very broad in his view of salvation as
being provided for all. He doeB not believe that God would
enter into a covenant with some certain few, making these so
distinctive that all other men would cry to heaven for
vengeance. Nor does he feel that an accident of time will
decide to whom he would grant hia favor.
... Or is it not rather worthy of God to make his
covenant with men equally difficult, since no man is
able to give himself the condition, nor yet is to re
ceive it from another, thus introducing new strife;
equally difficult but also equally easy, since God grants
the condition.7
Hence, all men everywhere and at all tiroes have absolutely
equal opportunity of and equal likelihood for salvation .
This would seem to imply strongly the universalist proposi
tion.
It must not be forgotten that the urge for salvation
has its motivation in the universal atate of "pathos" which
every man senses. This causes him to pursue the "eternal
happiness" as the absolute good by transforming the entire
existence of the individual. There is no pursuit by objec
tive manifestations, which makes salvation to him an en-
Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, p. 90
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tirely indiscernable and Imperceptible thing to the objective
eye.
Radar Thomte states very well the Kierkegaard Ian con
cept of pursuing salvation In the following:
� � . There are, according to Kierkegaard, only two
goals in human life. The one is the goal of eternity,
and is spoken of as God or an eternal happiness. This
is the goal which man ought to attain. The other Is the
goal of temporal existence* This Is the goal which man
desires to attain. These two goals are held to be con
trary to one another. It Is characteristic of the phil
osophy of Kierkegaard that the absolute goal is not de
fined according to its nature, but always according to
the manner which it Is possessed. It is the pathos of
the relationship to an eternal happiness which matters.
The pathos of the problem ia always to express the re
lationship to an eternal happiness, in the medium of
existence. It Is not a queation of "testifying about an
eternal happiness" but of "transforming one's existence
into a testimony concerning It."8
In the following manner Kierkegaard does a very com
plete Job of re-statlng his conoept of salvation into para
llel traditional orthodox terms.
When the disciple is in a state of Error. � � but la
not the less a human being, and now receives the condi
tion and the Truth, he does not become a human being for
the first time, since he was a man already. But he be
comes another man not In the frivolous sense of becoming
another Individual of the same quality as before, but in
the aense of beooming a man of a different quality, or
as we may call him: a new creature.
In so far as he was in Error he was constantly in the
act of departing from the Truth. In consequence of re
ceiving the condition in the moment of the course of his
life has been given an opposite direction, ao that he is
8Reldar Thomte , Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948), p. &W.
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now turned about. Let us oall this change Conversion,
even though this word be one not hitherto used; but that
is precisely a reason for choosing it, in order namely
to avoid confusion, for it is as if expressly coined for
the change we have in mind.
In so far as the learner was in Error by reason of
his own guilt, this conversion cannot take place without
being taken up in his consciousness, or without his be
coming aware that his former state was a consequence of
his guilt. With this consciousness he will then take
leave of his former state. But what leave-taking is
without a sense of sadness? The sadness in this case,
however, is no account of his having so long remained in
his former state. Let ua call such grief Repentance ;
for what is repentance but a kind of leave-taking, look-
ing backward indeed, but yet in such a way as precisely
to quicken the steps toward that whioh lies before?
Ita so far as the learner waa in Error, and now re
ceives the Truth and with it the condition for under
standing it, a change takes place w ithin him like the
change from non-being to being. But this transition
from non-being to being is the transition we oall birth.
How one who exists cannot be born; nevertheless, the
disciple is bom. Let us call this transition the new
birth, in consequence of whioh the disciple enters the
world quite as the first birth, an individual human
being knowing nothing aa yet about the world Into which
he Is bom, whether it is inhabited, etc.9
It would seem for all practical uae that these five
divisions cover the entire range of Kierkegaardian theology.
There are, of course, many other fin� points too numerous and
detailed for mention.
Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, pp. 13, 14
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II. HISTORY AND SALVATION AS POUND
WITHIN BARTH'S WRITING
In this final area of history and salvation, Barth
again does not stray far from the concepts of his predecess
or, Kierkegaard. By both men the historical is only casu
ally considered. The eternal history in God, which trans
cends the temporal, is the all important thing. Hence, the
whole Idea of salvation is also thought of as a deliverance
from natural history and the universal concepts whioh bond
age men, keeping them from the freedom of the Holy Spirit.
History. In Barth also the definition of God comes
very close to his concept of history. Like Kierkegaard,
Barth's idea of God is also rather Indefinite.
... We must be clear that whatever we say of God in
such human concepts can never be more than an indication
of Him: no such concept can really conceive the nature
of God. God is Inconceivable. What is eailed God's
goodness and God's holiness, cannot be determined by any
view that we men have of goodness and holiness, but It Is
determined from what God is. He is the Lord, He is the
truth. Only derivatively, only in a secondary sense can
we venture to take His Word on our lips . In the Apostles '
Creed there stands, in place of all possible description
of the nature of God, this one word, that He Is Almighty,
and significantly in connexion with the expression
'Father' . The one word explains the other; the Father
is almightiness and almightiness is the Father.10
Barth tends to merge heaven and earth in his idea of God,
A Karl Barth, Dogmatics In Outline, trans. G. T,
Thomson (New York: Philosophi oaT~LTB>ary , 1949), p. 46.
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God Is the "... Wholly Other, the infinite aggregate of all
merely relative others."*1 Though there are other possibil
ities for man's knowledge of God, It is only in the Bible that
God la regarded to be the first consideration and the all-
dominating theme. Prom the Blblloal knowledge of God man
gets hia starting point for all knowledge. Then Barth brings
in hia exlatentlal determinism that he received from Kierke
gaard:
... We are not outside, aa it were, but Inside. The
knowledge of God la not a possibility whioh we may, or
at worst may not , apply in our search for a meaning of
the world; it is rather the presupposition of the basis
of whioh oonsoioualy, half-consciously , or unconacioualy
all our searchinga for meaning are made. On the other
hand, we are far from being equal to that knowledge.**
Thia existential approach to God ia further amplified by
viewing Barth's idea of the Christ or the humanity of God;
... The humanity of God�that, rightly understood,
must mean: God* 8 relationship and approach to man; God,
who speaks to man in promise and commandment; God 'a
exiatence, intervention and aotion for him: the commun
ion which God holds with him; God's free grace, in whleh
He desires to be and la God not otherwise than as man's
**Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, trans.
Douglas Horton ( lassaohuseTt s : The Pilgrim Press, 1928), p. 74.
lg lb id., p. 52.
13Karl Barth, God, Grace and Gospel, trans, James
Strathearn McHab (London, Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd Ltd.,
1959), p. 51.
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This brings ths dlseussion pointedly to the idea of history.
The conoept of Christ is God breaking into natural history
as a mediator between the finite human being and the trans
cendent God. Here the unlikeness of man to God necessitates
the beginning of a new history*
� � � When God enters, history for the while ceases
to be, and there is nothing more to askj for something
wholly different and new begins�a history with its own
distinct grounds, possibilities, and hypotheses�**
On account of his concept of God and Christ, Barth
denies any history of religion as such Just as did Kierke
gaard. He does oonoede the fact that religious history did
somehow get started, However, of this he states?
... For at the moment when religion becomes con
scious of religion, when religion becomes a psychoTog-
ibally and hlstorlcaTIy~*conceiyablo magnitude in theworld, IF falls away from its inner character,"Trom its
truth, to idols, ita truth*Ts its other-worldlinesp,its' refusal of the idea of sacreaness, its non-hisTor-
IcTty7*g
� "
Just as did Kierkegaard, Barth in one sweep eliminates all
the validity of any historical happenings, whioh makes the
historical Jesus and anything pertaining to him become an
existential concept whioh is not tangible to the human per
ception*
... However, it may be with the historical Jesus,
it is certain that Jesus the Christ, the Son of the
Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, p. 53.
Ibid., pp. 68, 60.
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living God, belongs neither to history not to psychology;
for what is historical and psychological is as such
corruptible. The resurrection of Christ, or his second
coming, whioh is the same thing, is not a historical
event; the historians may reassure themselves�unless, of
course, they prefer to let it destroy their assurance�
that our ooncem here is with an event which, though it
is the only real happening in is not a real happening of
history. The Logos, if misunderstood, will stand
in the corner, as a myth. Better to do this than to be
shorn of its character of timelessness by being explain
ed historically. The dawn of the new time, of the sov
ereignty of him which is and which was and which is to
come�this is the meaning of Easter .16
This basic undercutting of the historical theology stems
primarily from Barth's non-historical view of the Bible.
Rather than a literal historical view of the Bible,
Berth sees a subjective element that teaches him certain
aspects about the One God.
... God Is the Lord and Redeemer, the Saviour and
Comforter of all the souls that turn to him; and the new
world is the kingdom of blessedness which is prepared
for the little flock who escape distruction. Is not
this In the Bible? . . . Again: God Is the fountain of
life which begins its quiet murmuring when once we turn
away from the externalities of the world and bow before
him in silence; and the new world is the incomparable
peace of such a life hid with Christ in God. Is not
this also in the Bible? . . � Again: God is the Lord of
heaven which awaits us, and in which, when our journey
through the sorrows and imperfections of this life Is
done, we are to possess and enjoy our citizenship; and
the new world Is Just this blessed other life, the
'still eternity' into which the faithful shall one day
enter. This Answer also comes directly from the Bible.17
AOJbid., p. 90.
17Karl Barth, "The Strange New World Within the
Bible," Contemporary Rel lglous Thought , Thomas S. Kepler,
editor ( New York, Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1941),
p. 139.
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The Bible for Berth is the history of man, just any man or
all men, with God as its subject. Through Christ, the Son
of man, all things are comprehended. The man who compre
hends is the "new man" who has eternity In his heart. Just
as Kierkegaard states, Barth speaks of the creation as a
". . . solemn marking of the distance between the cosmos and
the Creator, and preolsely not for a metaphysical explana
tion of the world."*8 The history of the Bible is seen from
above as a series of divine acts, while from below it is
seen as a series of fruitless human attempts to achieve by
self-effort a knowledge of God, which is impossible. Know
ing Barth's view of history, it is now understandable why he
refers to ethics as the "goal of earthly history" and why he
sees the "situation on Sunday morning" as an end of history
In an eschatologioal sense. It Is here that man's desire Is
expressed for an "ultimate" event.19
Once more Barth has taken a Kierkegaard Ian concept
and expressed It in the contemporary language so that It Is
made applicable in a life situation. Barth has done an ex
cellent work of translating this concept of history Into the
application of contemporary church activity.
Salvation. The concept of salvation has not been
18Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, p. 71
19Ibid,. pp. 110, 157, 158.
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without mention in the earlier discourse of this writing.20
However, some specific concepts must be mentioned as a means
of bringing this matter to a focal point of understanding.
Comparatively both Kierkegaard and Barth stand in agreement
at this point. Both men oonceive of a salvation which is
non-historical and decisive. It is not dependent upon any
systematic arrangement of truth but of a totally subjective
aotivity of God whioh requires no initiative of willful move
ment on the part of men.
The following quotation covers Barth's view* of salva
tion in general, giving hia underatanding of the function of
the concept "Jeaua Chriat" in man 'a aalvation.
... What Is meant by saying that Jesus Chriat is our
Lord? I have paraphrased it by saying that the exiatence
of Jesus Christ is the sovereign decision upon the exiat
ence of every man. A sovereign declaion has been made
about us men. Whether we realise it and do justice to
it ia another question. We have to be told that It ha8
been taken. Thia declaion has nothing to do with a des
tiny, a neutral and objective determination of man,
which could aomehow be read off from man's nature or
history; but this sovereign declaion on the existence of
every man consists In the existence of the man Jesus
Christ. Because he Is and was and will be, this sov
ereign declaion ia imposed upon all men. You remember
that at the beginning of our lectures, aa we were ex
pounding the concept of faith, we decided that Christian
faith muat be regarded abaolutely as a man's declaion,
which ia made in viewof a divine declaion. At thia point
we now see the concrete form of this divine decision.
When we say that God ia our Lord and Maater, we Christ
iana are not thinking, after the faahion of all myati-
20Cf, pp. 12, 12, S3, 34, 41-44, 54, 56, 70.
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eiam, of an indefinable and ultimately unknown divine
somewhat, which stands over us as a power and dominates
The decisiveness of man's salvation is seen to be totally in
the hands of God, the Holy Spirit being the only active agent
to create faith in man and make man's decision for him.
This is the reason that Barth views the matter of "Christian?
as a purely relative thing, when he states: "The Christian
Is that within us which is not ourself but Christ in us."22
Kierkegaard states the same idea in claiming that no one
ever became a Christian but everyone was always "becoming"
more or less Christian. There is no point of arrival for
either of these men. Yet because of the sovereign decision
there is also no point of lostness for man, In a literal
sense. As Barth contends we are moved by God. Thus in spite
of our consciousness or our con trarity, God has already de
cided salvation for us, and knowledge of such salvation will
dawn upon us in due season.
Just as Barth reflects Kierkegaard's universalism,
he also assimilates Into his own system Kierkegaard's nature
of salvation. Salvation becomes more of a psychological
adjustment to the status of existing circumstances through
the perceiving of God. However, not even this is a total
^Barth, Dogmatics in Outline . pp. 88, 89,
22Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, p, 273,
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adjustment, but a constantly adjusting thing.
... Man has always been ill and always will be.
In the life of individuals and nations, to be cured means i
to beoome a little less ill. The general ill which
afflicts humanity is today more visible than at any
other time. But, even in the great hospital of the pre
sent some patients suffer from more serious diseases than
others. And although many and Important things concern
ing all the patients can be said towards the solution of
this problem, the problem of a certain cure, is to be
considered and answered in different ways, according to
each individual case.25
True to Kierkegaard's idea, Barth sees this salvation for
man's malady as that whioh comes in spite of all forms of
religion.
... this new life is that from the third dimension
whioh penetrates and even passes through all our forms
of worship and our experiences; it is the world of God
breaking through from its self-contained holiness and
appearing in secular life; it is the bodily resurrection
of Christ from the dead. To participate in its meaning
and power is to discover a new motivation.�4
Any other experience than this Is an emotional misunderstand
ing. In Barth' a criticiam of religiou8 experience, he de
cries "form" and call8 for the "content" found in the "re
velation" of the Bible. Thua, Christian experience for Barth
can never have any element of human achievement, but is only
a reference to God's activity.
In Biblical experience nothing is lesa Important
than experience as such. It is an appointment and a
85Karl Barth, The Only Way, trans. Marta K. Neufeld,
Ronald Gregor Smith (New YorkiThilosophical Library Inc.,
1947), p. 3.
24Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, pp, 286,
287.
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commission , not a goal and a fulfillment ; and therefore
It Is an elementary thing, hardly oonsoious of itself,
and necessitating only a minimum of reflection and con
fession. The prophets and apostles do not wish to be
what they arej they have to be. And therefore they
are.85 ""
Barth Is just as adept as Kierkegaard in taking the
elemental terminology of salvation whioh has been used in
traditional theology and adjusting these terms to fit his
existential concept of salvation. In the quotation below,
Barth sees repentance as the effect of the Word upon us:
... Repentance is not an affair that we can accom
plish in our own resources. God's Word can be to us
such a law that, first of all, it floors us even in our
work-righteousness: its quality is enough to condemn us
in that, and it does so in such a way that we do not
know we are condemned. The law is not with us, "the
law of life," as Psalm cxix somewhat described it. It
Is left to the Holy Ghost; if so be we have not sinned
against Him, If we do not refuse to believe In our own
unbelief, and, therefore, in true repentance,26
In the next excerpt Barth describes the new birth as a God
given comprehension. Then he goes on to describe man's faith
as the activity of the Holy Ghost.
. . . Comprehension:--should not that mean hearing
God's Word, hearing God Himself? Por such comprehension,
even that continuity with God, that ability to take in
God's Word must be his own; yet It is not his own pos
session but it must simply be conveyed to him all along.
A sheer miracle must happenTo him, a second miracle in
addition to the miracle of his own existence, if his
25 lb id., p. 69.
2PKarl Barth, The Holy Ghost and the Christian Church,
trans. R. Birch Hoyle (London: Frederick Muller Limited^
1958), pp. 47, 48.
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life shall be a true Christian life, which la a life
within the hearing of God 'a Word. Thia miracle ia the
offioe of the Holy Ghost.
In the Holy Ghost the man exercises faith: the Scrip
tural proclamation of the revelation of God meets him
and points to him his way as a creature. In the Holy
Ghost he hears God's Word, far above any ethical reflec
tion whioh can be of service only in this mundane sphere,
and this Word Is not lost In the darkness of his human
ignorance. It is beyond any ability of ours to awaken
ourselvea in It. Because we are hearing we have no cer
tainty, no complete guarantee of truth, save only those �
things that are given to U8 in what has been said to
ua.*'
Eternal life becomes a vlaion for Barth:
... One ia taken with the vision of an immortality
or even of a future life here on earth in which the
righteoua will of God breaks forth, prevails, and is
done as it is done In heaven. In such wise the right-
eousneaa of God, far, strange, high, becomes our own
possession and our great hope.29
In the quotation below Barth sees redemption as the terminus
of God's way with our way. He also holds that being a "new
creatureH is to be given a divine comprehension of man's pre
dicament .
. � . He is not only the Alpha and Omega within Him
self, but is the Beginning and the End on our behalf
also. Thia is what He is still telling us, seeing that
He tells us that He ia our Creator and Reconciler: and,
seeing that He Is telling us this, we stand before Him,
and at the same time stand facing ourselves, as being at
the terminus of His way with us in our character as the
redeemed, and as those to whom He wills that they have
an all-final end and new-stating future. This Is said
to us from the farther side of the frontier of death, and
Ibid., pp, 26, 27.
Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, p. 26.
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said to ua who must die, and who cannot recognise their
death otherwiae than as the wages of their sin. This is
exactly why the promise la said to us. But It Is said
to ua in the full truth and reality of the Word who is
God, and because thia is said to us we are born again and
become "a new creature," "partaker of the divine nature"
(2 Pet, 1,4 )t God's children .29
Though both Kierkegaard and Barth hold the same basic
conception of salvation, Barth says much more about the
place of Jesus Chriat in man 'a salvation . Barth boldly pro
pounds his existential concept concern ing the salvation of
man aa if his ideaa atand in perfect alignment with what has
been believed by all good Christian theologies .
29Barth, The Holy Ghost and, the Chriat Ian Life, p. 75,
CHAPTER VII
SUM?.!ARY AMD CONCLUSION
This has been a comparative study of the theologies
of Seren Kierkegaard and Karl Barth designed to show the in
fluence of Kierkegaard's thought upon the theology of Barth.
Five major areas of Kierkegaard's theology have been used for
the basic outline of this disousslon. The first portion of
each chapter has been used to define an area of the theology
of SeVen Kierkegaard, while the second portion of eaoh chap
ter has been used to show the comparison of Karl Barth's
theology with Kierkegaard's theology.
I . SUMMARY.
This study began with the more general concepts of
subjectivity and existence, because these are so very basio
to philosophical and theological understanding. These con
cepts are discussed at great length in Kierkegaard and be
come the foundation for all his thinking. Though Barth does
not specifically categorize his theology under the subjective
and the existential, these are unmistakably present aa a
basis for all of his thinking. Barth's whole view of the
Bible Is a very direct application of these two elements.
Because of their views toward these categories, both men are
found arguing against the validity of reason. Yet here
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Barth seems to be the more extreme of the two. Man's exist
ence is for both men totally dependent upon God, though
Barth is more extreme in his emphasis upon the transcendence
of God. The "becoming" aspect of Kierkegaard is the "de
cisive" aspect found In Barth. This state of constant change
eliminates any formulated dogma on the part of either man,
except the dogma of existentialism. They are constantly
looking for the new to replace the old.
The subjectivism of Kierkegaard is found to be equally
prominent within Barth's writing. In fact, it is here that
Barth presses beyond Kierkegaard as he so totally ascribes
the activity of faith to the Holy Spirit. However, the same
idea of "passion" found in Kierkegaard is again paralleled
in Barth with an extreme emphasis on the transcendence of
God who controls man's spiritual activities. It is this
subjective element which Barth sees in the Bible as "revela
tion." Both men greatly downgrade all objective manifesta
tions of Christianity. All of Kierkegaard's involved argu
mentation about the "existential moment" and the passion
which leads man into it is translated into Barthlan terms
of the aotivity of the Holy Spirit, In their subjective
attitude toward man, both men are found strong in their
assertion of universal salvation, or the salvation of all
men.
Another large area of Kierkegaard's thought is that
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of sin and suffering. Hers again Barth has greatly imitated
him. Sin is more nearly a lack of man's understanding than
it is a defiant disobedience of the laws and will of God*
Man's greatest sin lies in his finite attempt to understand
God or be like God, who is infinite. Man has no knowledge
of good and evil except as it is given irresistably to him
by the Holy Spirit of revelation. Even then this knowledge
is not transferable to anyone else or to any other moment of
existence. For both Kierkegaard and Barth, the forgiveness
of sin is more akin to psychological adjustment. Neither of
these men try to explain the entrance of sin into the world
but rather refer to the Inevitable entrance of sin into the
career of every individual. Sin being what it is for them,
this precludes any doctrine of original sin as understood by
orthodoxy. Sin for these men is the knowledge of trying to
be like God, Kierkegaard spends more time discussing the
psychological beginnings of sin, whereas Barth spends more
time emphasizing the vast gulf between God and man.
Suffering is described by Kierkegaard with a variety
of words that define its psychological aspects. Barth tends
to reduce all this into a more simplified form which, never
theless, does not reduce the extent of his agreement with
Kierkegaard. Barth does, however, Introduce more of the
positive aspect to overshadow the element of suffering.
Suffering is summed up in the fact that man is irreconcll-
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able to God. In man's innocence he wants to know what God
knows and so he sins. In man's sin he tries to be God and
to understand himself and God. God in mercy spans this gap
between Himself and man through Christ's reconciliation of
the two extremes. Because this is a continual activity that
is never completed, man is always a little bit saint and a
little bit sinner. Man is never lost to a literal hell nor
saved to a literal heaven. Jesus Christ in becoming man has
mediated the gulf by placing Himself in man's sinful, suffer
ing position.
Faith and paradox become the next great area of
Kierkegaard's theology. Here again the subjective element
enters in very strongly. Kierkegaard thinks of faith in re
lation to the three levels of becoming Christian. Once
more, the element of the existential decisiveness prevents
any arrival by human initiative in finding the experience of
faith, Kierkegaard's existential "moment'' is divine action
which goes beyond human reason. He does allow for man's
resignation as preparatory to man's "leap" of faith. Barth,
however, Is strongly deterministic and makes no room whatso
ever for man's activity In his own faith. Barth's conception
of passivity leaves the Holy Spirit In complete charge of
spiritual destiny.
The paradox of faith found In Kierkegaard is similar
ly found within Barth's writing, though Barth does not de-
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scribe the psychological steps of faith in such detail as
Kierkegaard. Barth spends sore time applying the "paradox
of faith" theory to the doctrines of the church and more
specifically to the work of Christ and the Holy Spirit.
Barth also presses faith to an utter deterministic position
so that once faith is begun It never stops "becoming." This
merely serves as universalism and not as any great strides
in Christian grace. The paradox between God and man which
is only mediated by the "Absolute Paradox"�Jesus Christ,
keeps man from any tangible or concrete spiritual attainment
that might give occasion to man's major sin of pride.
Ethics and truth in the next great area of Kierke
gaard's theology, moves In the area of the practical. His
theory of "the temporary suspension of the ethical," whioh
is passed on to Barth, makes ethics a very relative and sub
jective thing. Any of the objective aspects of Christianity
are seriously frowned upon as being superficial, God has in
his infinite understanding set an ethical standard so trans
cendent to man's comprehension that only the "moment" of
Kierkegaard or the "revelation" of Barth can enable the in
dividual the briefest glimpse of truth by which he must of
necessity act in faith through the over-powerinr of the Holy
Spirit, Kierkegaard would make some allowance for man's
ability to resist God's movement, whereas Barth would not.
The relativity and subjectivity of ethics and truth
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make the transfer of these to any other individual an im
possibility. Thus, systematic outlines of truth and ethics
are purely relative and may even become an occasion of sin,
Barth does not define the various levels of religious life
as Kierkegaard does. Yet Barth applies the Kierkegaardian
concept of truth to the interpretation of Scripture which
results in his own theory of "revelation." The total pas
sivity of the individual in Christian experience Is far more
definite and dogmatic in Barth, Kierkegaard does allow for
some consciousness of man at this point. For both men the
existential process la basic to finding all truth, whether
it be knowing God the Creator of understanding the world of
God's creation.
Finally, history and salvation considered together,
form the concluding area of this discussion. Much within
this chapter has been mentioned in the preceding chapters,
yet for the purpose of definition it becomes important.
Kierkegaard and Barth reject the validity of natural history
and emphasize an existential history that relates man to God,
God is the supreme event in this divine history. All that
man Is, la quite insignificant and subordinate. The absolute
transcendence of God is highly Important to the thinking of
both of these men, Jesus Christ is God breaking in upon
history to bring about a reconciliation of man to God. This
is a relationship, and not a likeness to God. The apparent
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reign of God over natural history is relatively unimportant.
The great fact is, that God has a history of His own to
which men can only become a part as God's mercy deems it so.
For both Kierkegaard and Barth there i s a sense In which
every man sooner or later does become related to God's his
tory whether man is conscious of it or not.
Beoause of what has been previously reviewed It is
unnecessary to give here a detailed account of salvation.
Both Kierkegaard and Barth are quite in agreement with each
other. Kierkegaard emphasizes the "stages" in the way of
salvation while Barth emphasizes the absolute activity of
God in salvation. Both are speaking of a psychological
salvation from the sin of being human and yet trying to be
God. For both men salvation is universal in extent and
partial in effect. They are both quite adept at transfering
orthodox terms into their mold of thinking.
II . CONCLUSIONS
It is concluded from this study that Karl Barth re
ceived the major emphasis of his theology from the influence
of the theology of SeVen Kierkegaard. Barth, like Kierke
gaard, was in reaction against the strong effects of human
ism that were manifest in the respective churches of their
day. Both men yield to a subjective existentialism whioh
utterly destroys practical Christianity in the forms of
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personal witnessing, social reformation, missionary endeavor,
and evangelistic purpose.
Kierkegaard is much more psychological and philosoph
ical in his writing than Barth. Barth emphasizes more the
place of Jesus Christ in man's salvation, Barth is more
strongly deterministic than Kierkegaard as he places even
greater emphasis upon the transcendence of God. Kierkegaard
seems to imply some little preparatory effort by man In his
approach to salvation, namely resignation.
Barth has made Kierkegaard's major conoepts far more
applicable to the contemporary world of thought. Kierke
gaard's aloofness has been translated by Barth into theolog
ical concepts which are put into the practical use of the
church. The hyper-critical and cynical tone of Kierkegaard
has been put into the more conversational atmosphere of
Barth, who delves more into the detail of Christian theology,
especially in reference to the Bible, In doing this, Barth
perfects Kierkegaard's theories in Barth's own "new world"
found In the Bible, In fact, Barth carries Kierkegaard to
his logical conclusion,
III, SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Though this is purely a comparative study, it would
be of great Interest and profit to make a critical study of
the theologies of Kierkegaard and Barth in the light of
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conservative Christianity, since both systems of thinking
are so much in opposition to each other and yet parallel in
doctrines which they consider. The dialectio theology or
neo-orthodoxy has re-stated nearly every orthodox or con
servative doctrine in its own concepts and understanding.
It would also be highly profitable to show the in
fluence of Kierkegaard and Barth upon the entire field of
twentieth century theology. Such men as Reinhold Niebuhr,
Emil Brunner and Paul Tlllleh do have outspoken disagreement
with Kierkegaard and Barth, Yet these and many more have
reaped a certain effect upon their thinking from both Kierk
egaard and Barth because of the preceding thought of Kierk
egaard and Barth,
Another area in which study would be quite rewarding,
would be the investigation of the effect of the dialectio
theology upon the old-line liberalism. Some would argue
that dialectic theology has caused the more extreme liberal
to beoome more conservative, while others deny this on the
ground that neo-orthodoxy is not a move toward conservative
theology.
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